ASMX Security No Authentication - service

How do you prevent a third party from using an ASMX web service if you don't force users to authenticate?

Ultimately it will come down to who they are and how they access your web service. And the degree of risk they propose.
You could use simple "Security through Obscurity" where you don't tell people about the service. This is usually a very very poor solution. In fact it can be positively dangerous as you don't get to know who knows - so it's a real risk.
You could authenticate the machines and processes and not the people. Say for example IP addresses.
But at the end of the say you need to some form of authentication to determine any kind of filtering.

Related

Best practice for securing a client side call to an API endpoint

I'm building an application where I need to make a request in the client-side frontend app to an external API, and I'm at a bit of a loss for how to make this maximally secure so that only valid requests can be forwarded to this external API and not whatever anyone wants.
As a first step in security, I've made it so that the client-side app can't speak to the external API directly, but must instead hit our own server-side API, which then proxies the request to the external API, so that the credentials for hitting the external API are at least stored solely server side and not client side.
This, however, has led to the same fundamental issue - how do I secure whatever credential/authentication system I use to authenticate requests I make from the client-side app to our own server-side app?
The issue is this is an online restaurant ordering service, and so we don't expect users to authenticate themselves with say, usernames and passwords before being able to place orders necessarily, and so order placement, which triggers the external API call, isn't gated behind any username/password scheme, and must be available to all consumers of the frontend app.
What's the best practice for security here? I've enabled CORS whitelisting as a minimum practice, such that only requests from our own domain are theoretically allowed by our server side API endpoint, but CORS is trivially bypassed if someone chooses to just spoof the origin URL.
What other options are available? I'm sure I must just be missing something trivial, since this must be an extraordinarily common issue with an established best practice, but I'm just somehow failing to find it.
Thank you!
As a Developer Advocate for API and Mobile security, seeing a developer that really cares about their app security always makes me smile, especially when they already show some effort was made to secure it, therefore accept my congratulations for your efforts.
My Answer Context
I'm building an application where I need to make a request in the client-side frontend app to an external API, and I'm at a bit of a loss for how to make this maximally secure so that only valid requests can be forwarded to this external API and not whatever anyone wants.
So, you have not detailed if it's a web app or a mobile app, and once my expertise relies on mobile and API security I will be answering with the assumption that is a mobile app.
The Challenge
The issue is this is an online restaurant ordering service, and so we don't expect users to authenticate themselves with say, usernames and passwords before being able to place orders necessarily, and so order placement, which triggers the external API call, isn't gated behind any username/password scheme, and must be available to all consumers of the frontend app.
You have here a complicated challenge to solve, because you have an app that is open to the public, no user authentication/identification of any sort, but that requires rules of access to the underline resources as if it was behind user authentication and authorization, but even if it was, it would still be vulnerable to being abused.
To understand why I need to clear a misconception that usually I find among developers of any seniority, that is about the difference between who and what is accessing an API server.
The Difference Between WHO and WHAT is Accessing the API Server
I wrote a series of articles around API and Mobile security, and in the article Why Does Your Mobile App Need An Api Key? you can read in detail the difference between who and what is accessing your API server, but I will extract here the main takes from it:
The what is the thing making the request to the API server. Is it really a genuine instance of your mobile app, or is it a bot, an automated script or an attacker manually poking around your API server with a tool like Postman?
The who is the user of the mobile app that we can authenticate, authorize and identify in several ways, like using OpenID Connect or OAUTH2 flows.
Think about the who as the user your API server will be able to Authenticate and Authorize access to the data, and think about the what as the software making that request in behalf of the user.
So, in your case you cannot identify who is in the request, thus you need a solution that is able to give a very high degree of confidence to the API backend that the request is indeed from what it expects, a genuine and unmodified instance of your app.
Possible Solutions
I'm building an application where I need to make a request in the client-side frontend app to an external API, and I'm at a bit of a loss for how to make this maximally secure so that only valid requests can be forwarded to this external API and not whatever anyone wants.
This requires very advanced solutions to properly secure, thus isn't at all trivial to achieve as you may think:
I'm sure I must just be missing something trivial, since this must be an extraordinarily common issue with an established best practice, but I'm just somehow failing to find it.
And yes, it's a common issue that often is neglected or not addressed properly, and the first step to solve it is to have a clear picture about the difference between who vs what is in a request, otherwise the devised solutions will fail to address the issue properly.
For Mobile Apps
Here I recommend you to go through this answer I gave to the question How to secure an API REST for mobile app?, especially the sections Hardening and Shielding the Mobile App, Securing the API Server and A Possible Better Solution.
This answer will show you several solutions, like WAFs and UBAs, but ends with a recommendation to use a Mobile App Attestation concept.
In a nutshell the Mobile App Attestation will allow the API backend to have a very high degree of confidence that the request is indeed from what it expects, a genuine and modified instance of the mobile app.
For Web Apps
You can learn some useful techniques to help your API backend to try to respond only to requests coming from what you expect, your genuine web app, and to do so I invite you to read my answer to the question Secure api data from calls out of the app, especially the section dedicated to Defending the API Server.
Do You Want To Go The Extra Mile?
In any response to a security question I always like to reference the excellent work from the OWASP foundation.
For APIS
OWASP API Security Top 10
The OWASP API Security Project seeks to provide value to software developers and security assessors by underscoring the potential risks in insecure APIs, and illustrating how these risks may be mitigated. In order to facilitate this goal, the OWASP API Security Project will create and maintain a Top 10 API Security Risks document, as well as a documentation portal for best practices when creating or assessing APIs.
For Mobile Apps
OWASP Mobile Security Project - Top 10 risks
The OWASP Mobile Security Project is a centralized resource intended to give developers and security teams the resources they need to build and maintain secure mobile applications. Through the project, our goal is to classify mobile security risks and provide developmental controls to reduce their impact or likelihood of exploitation.
OWASP - Mobile Security Testing Guide:
The Mobile Security Testing Guide (MSTG) is a comprehensive manual for mobile app security development, testing and reverse engineering.
For Web Apps
The Web Security Testing Guide:
The OWASP Web Security Testing Guide includes a "best practice" penetration testing framework which users can implement in their own organizations and a "low level" penetration testing guide that describes techniques for testing most common web application and web service security issues.
Ultimately your client needs to perform some operation on 3rd party API.
So we know that some operations should be allowed, and based on your description we also know that not every operation should be allowed.
So your security should be based on this premise. Don't create a dumb proxy that forwards every single request, but your intermediate API should only specifically allow the operations that you want it to allow, based on the rules you set.
If you don't have a username & password, you probably still have some other kind of rule that identifies a person (email/phone number?), which means you can create an authentication system.
Or maybe your 3rd party service should only be called after a user completed an order with a credit card, that logic needs to exist on your API.

Is there a way to secure a public endpoint?

Am I correct in thinking that a public REST api, such as a registration endpoint can't authenticate a user. For example our endpoints should only accept requests coming from our mobile applications and future web apps.
I am pretty sure it's not logically possible. I think apple and google offer a way (acting like a ca) for the server to identify a request is coming from a registered device however that changes the API to a private one. As authentication is essentially moved to the app store so only owners of app store accounts can use it.
So keeping it completely public the only way to prevent bots attacking it is to use email confirmation with auto deletion if not confirmed in x amount of time, and IP rate limiting.
A contractor suggested we use a unique secret key hard coded in to each app however, that to me sounds illogical and completely wrong. A secret between the app and server is compromised the second a user downloads the application on their device.
So am I correct about the secret key, are there any other ways to secure the endpoint from bots? The only other thing I can think of is using a captcha.
There are 2 separate things here.
Securing Public REST APIs
You are correct that a secret, even an asymmetric one, would be compromised if the attacker downloads and reverse-engineers the application. Attackers can use debuggers, Chrome developer tools, and tools like Wireshark to reverse engineer and find the secret.
In general, an attacker can mimic the behavior of the app or user, i.e. same the same requests in very similar patterns.
The approach to this in today's industry is to filter out as many of those attackers as possible using tools like Web Application Firewalls, and increasingly, Bot Management solutions, which work for web, mobile, and APIs.
The better the tool, the more work the attacker has to do, ergo fewer are attackers willing to do it, ergo smaller chance of being attacked.
Secure Authentication
Authentication is a specific case of the above, however this problem is currently (one of) the biggest problem faced by web applications.
The main solutions employed today is are bot filtering techniques e.g. CAPTCHA (which resourceful attackers can overcome), and Multi-Factor Authentication.
It's quite uncommon these days to be able to register without email, however services such as 10 Minute Mail can be used to overcome this. It's actually not very difficult to set up your own mail server as well.
Login is more difficult because you can't expect people to go through email, and even other MFA methods get quite annoying. You'd be OK with MFA for your bank account, but not with MFA to your Domino's Pizza account.
Because of that, the latest fad in web attacks is Account Takeover.
All those security vendors which offer WAF and bot management also try to protect APIs such as registration & login, with various degrees of success. There are even dedicated products are starting to emerge.

How to secure Rest Based API?

We intend to develop rest based api. I explored the topic but it seems, you can secure api when your client is an app (So there are many ways, public key - private key etc). What about websites / mobile website, if we are accessing rest based api in website which do not use any login for accessing contents ( login would be optional ) then how could we restrict other people from accessing rest based api ?
Does it make sense using Oauth2.0 ? I don't have clear idea of that.
More clear question could be ,How can we secure get or post request exposed over web for the website which doesn't use any login ?
If it's simple get request or post request , which will return you json data on specific input, now i have mobile website , who will access those data using get request or post request to fetch data. Well, some else can also access it , problem is i am not using Login, user can access data directly. But how can we restrict other people from accessing that data.
What do you think is the difference between securing a website that is not using REST vs one that is using REST API?
OAuth provides authorisation capabilities for your site, in a REST architecture this means a user of the mobile application will have to provide their credentials before being allowed to access the resource. The application can then decide on if that user has access to the requested resource. However you've said your website doesn't need use authorisation.
You can use certificates however good luck managing the certificate for each client. My take on it is for your explanation you don't need to secure your website because you will never be able to manage a trust relationship between the client and the server. There are some options though:
You build your own client application that you ship out to people which can verify itself with the server using a packaged certificate with the client. E.g. iOS has this kind of feature if you build for that device.
You provide a capability to download a certificate that is 'installed' in the browser and used when communicating to your REST API
Use something like a handshaking protocol so when a client wants to make the first request it says; 'hi I'm a client can we chat?' And the server responds with 'yes for the next X minutes we can however make sure you send me this key everytime you tell me something YYYYYY' (you can use something like SecureUDID or equivalent for other devices than iOS).
There are probably others but you get the basic idea. Again in my opinion if your resource doesn't need authorisation then you don't need to secure that REST API. Can I ask what kind of data are you exposing via this REST API or functionality your providing? That might help provide a better answer.
You want authorization: only some agents (mobile clients) and/or users should be allowed to access those APIs.
To solve that problem, you need identification: a way for the server to tell who is who (or what), so the right decision can be made.
There are many different way to provide some form of identification, depending how much you care about security.
The simplest is a user agent string, specific to your mobile clients. But it can be faked easily. Slightly harder to fake are client based 'secrets' - embed some kind of secret or key in your mobile client code. You can make it really complicated and secret, but as ramsinb pointed out, you can't get security this way as it would require you to be able to guarantee that the secret you're shipping with the client (wether it's code, algorithm or any other fancy construct) can't be compromised or reverse engineered. Not happening when you don't control the client.
From there, 3 choices:
Security isn't really required, don't bother
Security isn't really required, but you still want to limit access to your API to either legit users/agents or people ready to invest some time hacking your protection - go with a specific user agent or a client embedded secret - don't invest much into it as it won't block people who really want access to get it anyway
Security IS required - and then I don't think there is a way around authentication, wether it's login/password, user specific (device specific?) keys, OpenID, etc... No matter what, you'll have to add to the user burden to some extent, although you can limit that burden by allowing authentication to persist (cookies, storage....)

Usage of SAML attribute AttributeStatement

in SAML 2.0 you can use the AttributeStatement element to provide any kind of application specific information.
What I was wondering, is it really good design to pass business related information within a SAML assertion? Shouldn't this data be provided in a e.g. separate web services call?
I just want to ask for best practice in this case or any real world experiences.
Regards,
Andreas
It depends a lot on just what information you're conveying. For instance, on the application I work on, we use attributes to indicate what web site features should be shown to the user being logged on. That's clearly an appropriate use. Now, we also allow use of attributes to create a user profile, even though we have a web service that does the same thing (and in fact, the implementation calls the web service behind the scenes). It's not an ideal context for that sort of thing; there's no endpoint to convey the web service response to, or any errors resulting from the attempt. But we get a fair amount of resistance from customers, who don't want to have to call a separate web service before they can make an SSO call. So we've had to compromise. What we've done is require that if a customer wants to use this particular functionality, that they provide an endpoint (either email address or web page) to receive errors from the web service call. And if they're concerned about security of the information being conveyed, they can use standard XML encryption.

Why I should NOT use Facebook Connect or OpenId for logging in users?

Jeff Atwood argues that we should stop asking users to register on our websites because we should rather use their "internet driver's license -- that is, [their] existing Twitter, Facebook, Google, or OpenID credentials" for authenticating them.
While I am beginning to think that he may be right, I could not yet decide and I am looking for arguments against letting foreign sites gain control over personal web pages.
Do you see any dangers of authenticating users like this?
if you want a more in depth response based from someone who has dealt with this technology before, you should listen to the recent .NET Rocks with Rob Connery which was precisely about this topic.
http://www.dotnetrocks.com/default.aspx?showNum=626
After listening to it I decided to NOT use OpenID on my site.
Here is the link to Rob's blog post on the subject:
http://blog.wekeroad.com/thoughts/open-id-is-a-party-that-happened
Here are a number of reasons why not, although each comes with caveats:
If you only authenticate with one external service, anyone who doesn't use that service cannot use yours.
If your external authentication service goes down, users won't be able to use yours until theirs comes back up; similarly, slowdowns in their authentication server will also affect you.
Requiring users to authenticate with another service requires them to accept that service's EULA, which may be a turnoff for some; similarly, it ties you morally to whatever decisions your authenticating service makes. In particular it can make you appear to be a satellite, spinoff or affiliate of the auth site, since users have to see their logo every time they try to use your service.
The external auth domain gets a perfect snapshot of your viewership, giving them a lot of insight into what your company is doing. Since their analytical tools and staff are generally top-notch, they may conceivably know more about your user base than you do.
The major way to avoid this problem is to allow people to use the service of their choice, instead of a single service. If you are limited to developing one, for development time constraints, using OpenID is the best bet because many other authentication domains also qualify as OpenIDs, and therefore ameliorates most of the above problems.
I think using IDs from any of these big names are ok as long as you don't provide service that needs an endpoint like email, IM etc.
However, OpenID is just not trust-worthy. If you have any doubts, try this OpenID
http://opennoid.appspot.com/anyid
This is a disposable ID that doesn't require a password to login.