I would like to know whether OSB plays a crucial role in terms of security apart from just behaving as a middle-ware.
Inbound Security:
Inbound security ensures that Oracle Service Bus proxy services handle only the requests that come from authorized clients. (By default, any anonymous or authenticated user can connect to a proxy service.) It can also ensure that no unauthorized user has viewed or modified the data as it was sent from the client.
You set up inbound security when you create proxy services and you can modify it as your needs change. For outward-facing proxy services (which receive requests from service consumers), consider setting up strict security requirements such as two-way SSL over HTTPS. For proxy services that are guaranteed to receive requests only from other Oracle Service Bus proxy services, you can use less secure protocols.
For each proxy service, you can configure the following inbound security checks:
Transport-level security applies security checks as part of establishing a connection between a client and a proxy service. The security requirements that you can impose through transport-level security depend on the protocol that you configure the proxy service to use.
For example, for proxy services that communicate over the HTTP protocol, you can require that all clients authenticate against a database of users that you create in the Security Configuration module of the Oracle Service Bus Administration Console. You then create an access control policy that specifies conditions under which authenticated users are authorized to access the proxy service.
Custom Authentication for message-level security. Oracle Service Bus supports client-specified custom authentication credentials for inbound transport- and message-level requests. The custom authentication credentials can be in the form of a custom token, or a username and password.
Message-level security (for proxy services that are Web Services) is part of the WS-Security specification. It applies security checks before processing a SOAP message or specific parts of a SOAP message.
Outbound Security
Outbound security secures communication between a proxy service and a business service. Most of the tasks that you complete for outbound security are for configuring proxy services to comply with the transport-level or message-level security requirements that business services specify.
For example, if a business service requires user name and password tokens, you create a service account, which either directly contains the user name and password, passes along the user name and password that was contained in the inbound request, or provides a user name and password that depend on the user name that was contained in the inbound request. For more information, see Section 2.1.15, "Creating Service Account Resources."
If a business service requires the use of PKI technology for digital signatures, or SSL authentication, you create a service key provider, which provides private keys paired with certificates. For more information, see "Service Key Providers" in the Oracle Fusion Middleware Administrator's Guide for Oracle Service Bus.
More info (Oracle Official Documentation):
https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E29542_01/dev.1111/e15866/model.htm#OSBDV1476
Related
I have a Keycloak server that is functioning as my identity provider, using X.509 authentication to the users in my realm. I have successfully configured this as an external identity provider (SAML 2.0) to an ADFS server since I'm trying to allow access to an IIS-hosted web application through Web Application Proxy.
My current effort is to configure the claim rules to map the incoming SAML assertion attributes to internal Active Directory user accounts, so that ADFS/WAP can perform integrated Windows authentication internally once the external authentication is mapped to an internal user.
Most of the search results I've found address the exact opposite, assuming that I've authenticated with ADFS and need to map LDAP attributes to an outgoing claim.
Can anyone provide help, or direct me to a good source?
I understand that keycloak has built-in clients and we add the users later on.
But in general, what is the difference between a client and a user in Keycloak?
According to the Keycloak documentation
User - Users are entities that are able to log into your system
Client - Clients are entities that can request Keycloak to authenticate a user. Most
often, clients are applications and services that want to use Keycloak to secure
themselves and provide a single sign-on solution. Clients can also be entities that
just want to request identity information or an access token so that they can
securely invoke other services on the network that are secured by Keycloak
In short words, not only for keycloak but for OAuth and OpenId Connect too, a client represents a resource which some users can access. The built-in clients for keycloak represent some resources for keycloak itself.
Clients and users are two completely different constructs in keycloak.
In plain English, client is an application. Example for an application could be a e.g. yelp.com or any mobile application. Client can be a simple REST API. Keycloak's built in clients are for keycloak internal use, But any user-defined application has to be registered as a client in keycloak.
Users are the one which authenticate via keycloak to gain access to these applications/clients. Users are stored in keycloak DB or any externally hosted LDAP but synced with keycloak.
Given that I would create an OAUTH2 authentication server.
Given that I would to have separate resource servers, exposing REST APIs.
What are the best communication practies between the authentication server and the API servers?
To explain OAUTH2 server would be a proxy authenticating the user and forwarding requests to different API servers, that are not third party, but under the hood of the OAUTH2 proxy, relying on it to know the agent (user) requesting for the given command\query.
The simplest would be that the authentication server will forward the user id (that is stored with ACL rules also on each API server) under a secure connection, and that access would be restricted to request forwarded from authetication server to resource API servers.
The auth server would in this case forward the user id, but this seems suceptible to mand in the middle attack (altought firewall on API servers would be configured to accept requests only from the authentication server).
Another problem would be compromission of the OAUTH proxy, giving automaticly grant to any request coming from it.
Are there ready solution and patterns to deal with this scenario?
Thanks!
Check the User Account and Authentication Service (UAA) from CloudFoundry. Maybe will help you. It is also available as a stand-alone OAuth2 server.
API Documentation, GitHub
I'm designing a REST service in Node, and I have a plan for authentication and authorization -- but I'm not certain whether there's an unforeseen flaw in the design.
I have a central API server exposed to the Internet. The server also hosts a manager application (which communicates via AJAX), but is authenticated separately from the API, per requirement.
My initial thoughts are to have the server authenticate the user with a login form, then send the user a token (all over HTTPS, of course) that can be sent with each request to the API server for authentication and authorization.
Are there any flaws with this methodology?
I have a scenario where my service which is an OSB need to act as a pure-passthrough service for a client sending a SAML token to a Service requiring the token.
We are using wss10_saml_token_service_policy on OSB Proxy Service and wss10_saml_token_client_policy on OSB Business Service.
My question is, for this simple token, do we require to establish a trust (importing my certificate to the Server Keystore, and client's certificate into my keystore)?
I know if SSL related policies or message encryption related policies are used, trust is to be established. But is it required for this policy?
FYI,
a simple SAML token doesn't require trust establishment. It simply checks for the subject in the assertion, and validates against the underlying LDAP, and if exists, it passes through.
Only message protection policies require trust establishment - importing certificates, registering keys in the keystores, etc.