I have written an iPhone application communicating with a server. The app sends a message to the server and prints the result.
Now I have a question: Is there a way to know if the message sent to the server came from an iPhone?
I am asking this because I want to prevent attackers from sending messages from somewhere else and flooding the server.
If you use in-app purchases, then there is a full authentication chain that validates device X purchased the app. You're server can track this and then only give full responses to previously authenticated devices.
This approach also keeps pirated apps pretty much out of the picture.
This approach wouldn't stop a concerted DDOS attack, but your server can at least ignore non-valid clients and thus reduce its workload significantly. Since your server is ignoring invalid requests here, it also makes it less appealing to potential non-device users and the illicit user would probably only attack you if they disliked you, as opposed to them just bogging down your server for its free web services.
If you don't use in app purchases, you could set up your own authentication process and give a token to the device and have your server remember said tokens, and then later only serve valid responses for requests that had the said token (appropriately hashed and salted). This approach would not stop pirated apps from using your service, but would effectively stop non-devices from using your web service (again, except for concerted hacking efforts).
An even simpler approach is to have an obfuscated request format that would take a concerted effort to reverse engineer.
In all of these approaches, you might have to monitor your server for unusual activity and then taking appropriate steps.
I would encourage you to match your efforts to the expected risk. You can spend days, months, even years, properly securing an app, make sure the cost is worth the reward.
You could do some form of authentication, encryption or fingerprinting, eg. using SHA, MD5, etc. That way you could make it difficult (but not impossible) for an attacker to abuse your server.
You can't tell it's from an iPhone until you have received and examined the connection on the server. If you do that, you have already opened the possibility of a DOS (Denial of service) attack due to connection exhaustion.
Related
We have a large number of small devices deployed in the wild that communicate with a central server via a REST API. It will send a status update on a regular basis with some sensor data and will also ask the server if there are any software updates that need to be applied. If there are, it will download it etc.
I'd like some way to prevent my server API from being used by unauthorised clients. Here are the solutions that I have and the issues which I anticipate. This question is somewhat open ended but it is mostly a question of best practices for, what I think is, a common situation.
Keep a single username/password on the server and then use basic auth over https. This is simple but if I change it, I'd have to somehow change the credentials on all of my devices (which number in the low thousands). This is hard to do reliably. There's also a problem with how the devices are going to get the update without first changing their creds.
The second is to create a username/password for every device. Then I can update individual ones and manage them but there's a lot of state on the server and I'm worried about having this much data on the server.
Some kind of automatic key based system whereby the devices can ask for an expirable key and then use that for all transactions. If the key expires or is invalidated, that device can't connect anymore. This would necessitate some kind of id for the device which I'm not sure how to handle.
So, how would I do this?
Update
In our setup, we have assigned hostnames for each of the devices we're going to deploy created beforehand. Once the devices switch on, they will contact the server with their hostnames and thereby register themselves. The MAC address and other information is passed as part of the initial registration handshake.
So, the "unique identifer" which was mentioned in the answer (and comment) by Noksi is the hostname. This can be easily spoofed (since the hostnames have a pattern). However, when the devices first come online, we can get the mac and, after that, only refresh the token if the request comes from the same mac. This opens up the possibility of a fake registration happening the first time though.
If there is some way to uniquely identify each device (similar to a MAC address) then that would be the key. Keep a registry of the devices and each device would register with the server. the server would provide the device with a token and associate it (the token) with the registered device. the device uses that token to make requests. tokens can be made to expire and renewed as needed or can be black listed if needed. This seems to be similar to option 3 in the proposed options.
A client asked me to do a back-end server for its iPhone application and want only users who bought the application to be able to call the server.
The problem is that he doesn't want to add a login system to the application, so that it seems to me there is no completely safe way to prevent someone without his application calls the server.
In any case, even if it can not be completely prevented, it would be sufficient to make it difficult to access servers without the application.
What is the best way to achieve this? Again, I do not need to fully protect the connection, there is no transit of sensitive information, I just want to make things a little more complicated for people who want to take advantage of server without paying the application.
The idea that seems most simple is to encrypt the data with a key stored within the client and known to the server, so that the message can be decrypted only decompiling the code and finding the key (of course instead of a key you could put a list of keys, which change every 6/12/24 hours).
Could this be a reasonable solution?
This will never be possible. Welcome to the nature of the client-server architecture. You can never trust the client. Just make sure the functionality you are exposing is safe.
well if its a paid app you could release the app for free with all the functionally locked down until a user does a in app purchase and then you could verify the receipt on your server therefore proving that the device is a iOS Device?
sharing a key between the client and the server seems to be a good way to go. But instead of depending on the stored keys only, try combining them with a Unique identifier, such as UUID and send it to server both with the combined key, and the UUID itself.
At that point users UUID will be his identifier (username) and the combined key will be his token (password). And this will be a login-like mechanism.
An SSL connection is not enought to prevent other people from getting the URL for the requests? Or even better using an SSL connection with a basic auth?
We want to use a web service in our app which obviously requires to call a URL. It's not HTTPS, just plain old HTTP, using NSURLConnection.
The problem is: This web service is VERY expensive and every thousand calls costs us real money. The fear is that someone could figure out which URL we call and then misuse that, letting the costs explode. There is no way for us to track if a call to that web service was legitimate.
We're calculating based on how many apps we sell, multiplied by an assumption of how often that app will be used per user in average. We have some good statistics on which we base our assumptions.
Are there known ways of figuring out which URL an app is calling on the Internet to retrieve information?
You could easily use a network sniffer while the phone is on WiFi to figure out this information. It sounds like it is actually critical that you use SSL with some sort of secure token in the URL.
If this is not an option perhaps you can provide your own proxy service that would use SSL and security tokens? Proxy also grants the ability to throttle requests and block users known to be malicious. Throttling puts an upper bound on the expense each user can incur within a given time interval. Another benefit of a proxy is that it allows one to gather statistics and measure the costs incurred by different users facilitating malicious user detection and business planning. Proxy could also save you some money if the service behind it is stateless by adding a cache that would remove a lot of expensive calls.
If the Web service is not encrypted, it would be trivial to use a proxy to intercept the Web requests made by the phone. If the expensive Web service does not offer at least some form of basic authentication, I would seriously reconsider including its URL in a public app.
Using plain URLs is a sure way of letting script kiddies run you out of business. If there is no way for you to track if a call to the expensive web service was legitimate, set up your own web service that fronts the real web service to make sure that your own web service can verify the legitimacy of the call before forwarding the request to the real web service.
Yes, there's plenty of ways to do this. For one example, hook up the iPhone to a wifi network, in which the router has a transparent proxy. Examine the proxy's logs. You'll see all URLs. Depends how determined your users are, but this is rather easy.
Ignoring the fact that people who jailbreak their devices could possibly look at your application, I believe it is possible to examine traffic like any other device (laptop, tablet, etc.) if someone was sniffing traffic over a WiFi hotspot using applications such as WireShark. However, I doubt there would be much risk of this over a cellular 3G network.
Good question.
As many have said, yes, it's easy to figure out the urls your app requests.
Note about HTTPS:
But since you are using HTTPS you are okay because over HTTPs the domain will be obscured to the IP address, and people cannot see the URL query string parameters. For example, if your URL was https://somewebsite.com?uid=mylogin&pass=mypass, they definitely won't be able to see "uid=mylogin&pass=mypass", and they probably can only see the IP address, not the domain name itself. (see https://serverfault.com/questions/186445/can-an-attacker-sniff-data-in-a-url-over-https)
Sidenote:
Might be safe to assume that Apple performs some sort of HTTP request diagnostics when they review your app -- which would make sense because it's in their best interest to try and figure out what your app does from many angles.
I have an iphone app that retrieves and send data to a server that uses python.
What measures could i take in order to prevent security risks?
I an not handling extremely sensitive data but i wouldn't want people sniffing the contents.
Is using SSL enough to prevent most risks?
Thanks
SSL should be sufficient. It's also a good idea to store the user's password (if you need one to login) inside the Keychain. Btw, don't send anything to the server in a QueryString, always do it with a post, otherwise the SSL won't do much to help you.
If you don't have super-sensitive data, you can also use HMAC messages in order to query your server. I've done this with several projects before.
The message sent to the server may be a little more heavy-weight but is a viable option if you don't want to go with getting a SSL certificate.
I'm building a client/server iPhone game, where I would like to keep third-party clients from accessing the server. This is for two reasons: first, my revenue model is to sell the client and give away the service, and second I want to avoid the proliferation of clients that facilitate cheating.
I'm writing the first version of the server in rails, but I'm considering moving to erlang at some point.
I'm considering two approaches:
Generate a "username" (say, a GUID) and hash it (SHA256 or MD5) with a secret shipped with the app, and use the result as the "password". When the client connects with the server, both are sent via HTTP Basic Auth over https. The server hashes the username with the same secret and makes sure that they match.
Ship a client certificate with the iPhone app. The server is configured to require the client certificate to be present.
The first approach has the advantage of being simple, low overhead, and it may be easier to obfuscate the secret in the app.
The second approach is well tested and proven, but might be higher overhead. However, my knowledge of client certificates is at the "read about it in the Delta Airlines in-flight magazine" level. How much bandwidth and processing overhead would this incur? The actual data transferred per request is on the order of a kilobyte.
No way is perfect--but a challenge/response is better than a key.
A certificate SHOULD use challenge/response. You send a random string, it encrypts it using the certificate's private key, then you get it back and decrypt it with the public key.
Depending on how well supported the stuff is on the iPhone, implementing the thing will be between trivial and challenging.
A nice middle-road I use is xor. It's slightly more secure than a password, trivial to implement and takes at least an hour or two of dedication to hack.
Your app ships with a number built in (key).
When an app connects to you, you generate a random number (with the same number of bits as the key) and send it to the phone
The app gets the number, xor's it with the key and sends the result back.
On the server you xor the returned result with the key which should result in your original random number.
This is only slightly hacker resistant, but you can employ other techniques to make it better like changing the key each time you update your software, hiding the random number with some other random number, etc. There are a lot of tricks to hiding this, but eventually hackers will find it. Changing the methodology with each update might help.
Anyway, xor is a hack but it works for cases where sending a password is just a little to hackable.
The difference between xor and public key is that xor is EASILY reversible by just monitoring a successful conversation, public key is (theoretically) not reversible without significant resources and time.
Who is your adversary here? Both methods fail to prevent cracked copies of the application from connecting to the server. I think that's the most common problem with iPhone game (or general) development for paid apps.
However, this may protect the server from other non-iPhone clients, as it deters programmers from reverse engineering the network packet interfaces between the iPhone and the server.
Have your game users authenticate with their account through OAuth, to authorize them to make game state changes on your server.
If you can't manage to authenticate users, you'd need to authenticate your game application instance somehow. Having authentication credentials embedded in the binary would be a bad idea as application piracy is prevalent and would render your method highly insecure. My SO question on how to limit Apple iPhone application piracy might be of use to you in other ways.