I currently have two relying parties (RP) configured on my adfs 2.0 server. I also have two claims provider trusts. I simply want to restrict access to the first RP if the user belongs to claims provider 1.
Is there a claim rule I can put that would let me inspect the user's issuer and then grant access or not?
I'm also wondering if this behavior is even acceptable in a SSO infrastructure. Should I deploy two instances of ADFS 2.0 in order to support this (one trusts claims provider 1 while the other doesn't).
Thanks for any ideas or design inputs.
I don't know if this is a good idea, but this should work:
Add a custom rule to the claims provider you want to deny with content like this:
=> issue(Type = "http://schemas.YOURDOMAINHERE/claims/AccessRP_X", Value = "Deny");
Then on the RP, edit claim rules,
choose Issuance authorization rules,
Add Rule.
In the dialog, use
template "Permit or Deny Users based
on an Incoming Claim".
For incoming
claim type, use the same type as in
the custom rule.
In incoming claim
value, write Deny
And Choose the
radio button "Deny access to users
with this incoming claim".
Press finish
Hope this works for you.
Related
I have a question regarding claim rules and how they are processed in ADFS. As per my understanding after reading [this] (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-fs/technical-reference/the-role-of-the-claims-engine) there are three parts of claim rules execution - Initialisation (Input claims set is created and the input claims are placed here), execution of conditions and rules in a claim rule, and issuance of claims to a relying party. What I am trying to understand is if there is only default claims trust provider, i.e. AD and a user logs in trying to do IdP Initiated SAML, then at the initial phase, is the input claim set populated with all the attributes of a user in AD? Before the execution process starts, who or what decides that what will be present in the input claims?
At logon time the claims rules on the claims provider (AD in your case) decide what's available in the pipeline. Not all user attributes populated in AD for the user are read. E.g. if mobile is populated it wont be read and mapped to some claim.
So after credentials are validated the AcceptanceTransformRules on the claims
After logon IssuanceAuthorizationRules are used to decide whether to issue claims or not. Assuming you get past this stage with at least one permit and zero deny, then you move to the issuance transform rules processing stage on the relying party.
When the issuancetransformrules defined on the relying party are executed and you choose to issue a claim that uses an AD attribute such as mobile, you can choose to issue a claim like http://myorg.com/mobile with the mobile attribute value. The LDAP queries to use the AD attribute store are used at this point. You can also choose to use incoming claims added at logon time as input at this stage to decide what to add/issue to the pipeline.
Once all the issuancetransformrules are processed, based on what you choose to explicitly pass through claims added to the pipeline at the claims provider trust level may or may not be sent to the relying party.
Use https://adfshelp.microsoft.com/ClaimsXray/TokenRequest to play with different combinations of rules on the CP and RP trust levels to further your understanding.
So, when management tells us our website needs to "support SSO through SAML 2.0", with no additional details, what are they thinking?
What will our customers expect?
Note - The is not an open website, where everyone can join. To log in you need to be a configured user in the system. The customer's admins need to create an account in our system for each user.
So we aren't going to let just anyone who has an account with an IdP in to our website. We'll have to have some mechanism for mapping a SAML identity to our users.
How would our customers expect that to work?
Based on hints in your question, I am going to presume that you will be acting as a service provider.
To be what I would call a "good" service provider, I would expect the following:
You sign your AuthnRequests.
You provide a metadata endpoint that is kept up to date with your SP metadata to include current public keys for encrypting attributes (if necessary) to be sent to you as well as validating your AuthnRequest signatures.
You support dynamic consumption of my identity provider's metadata endpoint to keep your side of the connection up to date, especially with concern to my signing certificate.
You expose management of my identity provider configuration inside of your service provider mechanism to my IdP administrators through a web or API interface.
You either support a mechanism to automatically manage my users (like via SCIM or Graph or something else), or you support Just-In-Time provisioning based on an incoming assertion.
You allow me to decide my SAML Name ID format, and that format is per-tenant. As an example, I may want to use email address as the identifier, while another IdP may want to use sAMAccountName. e.g., john.doe#domain.com vs. johndoe.
You support Service-Provider-Initiated SSO. That means that the user shows up to partner1.yourdomain.com and get redirected for authentication to that partner's IdP, and that going to the location partner2.yourdomain.com would redirect to a different IdP.
As a service provider, you should make using your service easy and secure. By shifting to SAML, it allows you to get out of the business of password and user management because you get to put that back on the identity provider. It allows your users to not have to type in a password (or more, if you're doing MFA) to use your service, removing friction caused by security. It allows you to put the onus of authenticating the user back on the organization that owns the identity.
Your customers would expect that if they have an application that uses the SAML 2.0 client-side stack then when the application sends an AuthnRequest, they will see a login page on your site and once authenticated, the application will receive a set of assertions (claims) from your IDP via an AuthnResponse.
One of these assertions is NameID. This is the "primary key" between their system and yours. Normally this is UPN or email.
This mapping is outside of the SAML spec. There needs to be some kind of "on-boarding" for the customers.
I have ADFS server and proxy server installed and few Relying party trusts added to it for sso.It is SP initiated and it all works fine. I have restricted access to a AD group for one of the RP site. When non-member of the group tries to access the site using the SP initiated URL, it gives an error (Missing SAML attributes). When logs checked, it is found that for the non-group members claim value is passed as "nil". Is there any way we can redirect the unauthorised user to another page or simply displaying an error like " YOu are not allowed access".
Please help
Thanks in advance
If ADFS is configured to pass groups as Roles, then use IsInRole and use that to redirect to an error message.
Update:
This can be done by adding a so-called Issuance Authorization Rule.
Essentially:
Go to the Issuance Authorization Rules tab
Delete the default Permit Access To All Users rule
Click Add Rule
Select Permit or Deny Users Based on an Incoming Claim
I'm working on setting up a service provider that supports SAML. I've added two identity providers - one custom one that I built from SimpleSAMLphp and then ssocircle. So I log in to the selected identity provider, and then it returns to my service provider and I inspect the attributes of the SAML Auth object. The identity provider I built returns whatever I want it to (obviously). The ssocircle one only returns e-mail, first, and last names.
So now to map this to the user of the service provider, I have to use some value the identity provider provides. So this led me to wonder how it should be done. Since ssocircle only gives me e-mail as a useful value, do I just use the e-mail to map to the SP user?
Let's pretend for a second that ssocircle doesn't validate e-mail addresses. So now if I create a second account at ssocircle with the same e-mail, I can log in as my coworker who I know has admin privileges.
So my question is, do I handle this? Or is the onus on the admin who set up the identity provider and say "well you shouldn't have used an identity provider that doesn't validate e-mail addresses!" or something of that nature? Or should I only allow identity providers that pass a certain value, like userid or 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1? Is there something that identity providers commonly use?
Well, you said it, two different identity providers. They both should be passing not only the email but different entity ids and certificates.
In multi-tenant applications that would mean two different applications, but if you plan to allow multiple IDPs to point to a single app you will need to ensure that same email but different entityID create two different users and or throw an error after the first was created that the second cannot be provision nor access.
Interesting question. These days people think always of auto federation of users by some attribute. In early SAML federation days federating two unrelated users was a manual step in which a user logs in at the IDP and logs in to the SP providing both sets of credentials and then manually federated these two user accounts. The process guarantees that only the user who has access to the accounts at the IDP and SP controls the linkage between the two. It also allows anonymous naming identifiers (SAML persistent NameIDFormat) which protects privacy because even the IDP does not know the user name at the SP and vice versa.
Unfortunately the process was to complicated for users and with the success of OpenID the aspect was getting less and less important.
To answer your question: What you describe happens in the real world -see Office 365 authentication bypass
You need to check that the IDP is authoritative to send a specific attribute and attribute scope in case of two IDPs.
In case of one IDP the attribute must be verified (SSOCircle verifies email address) and it should better be unique (For example SSOCircle userId) to avoid that two users with the same attribute are mapped to a single user at the SP.
If the userid's are not the same (e.g. you use a simple user ID at the IDP and email address format at the SP) you can still add a correlation attribute at the SP (e.g. an attribute named ssocircle-userid) and use that to link the user accounts.
I was told that it is possible to give information about group membership during a SAML authentication request. We have to connect to an application that does use SAML (we are at the end that is creating the SAML answer XML). Authenticating a user works fine but I can't find a way to specify a "member of" or similar attribute.
Can you explain to me how to pass group memberships in SAML during authentication or have an example ?
I know there is a possibility to take care of authorization in SAML at a socalled Policy Decision Point. But this would mean that a SAML flow would happen for each or some (if batched) entities we want to check authorization for.
Let me give you an example what we are trying to do. This example is made up but shows the problem we want to solve.
Let's assume you have a hard drive with lots of directories and files on it. We use SAML to authenticate the person that tries to access that drive. Members of the group "admin" are allowed to read and write and members of group "user" are only given read permission.
Because of this we want to send the group memberships of a user when he or she authenticates. Because otherwise it would mean that the application has to check for every file if the user is in the necessary group. If it was clear from the beginning (after authentication took place) that someone is a member of a specific group the application can cache that in memory.
As with most things in SAML, this depends on the identity provider as well as the application.
Many identity providers have access control to allow or deny specific users or groups to access an application. Sign-on is then denied by the IdP after authentication based on the ID of the application (from the SAML request) and access control configured in the IdP. If you just want to control who has access to the application, then this is all you need, and most, if not all, identity providers should have you covered.
Sometimes you also want different users or groups to have different permissions inside the application, or you want memberships in certain groups on the IdP to be mapped to membership in groups inside the app's own user and group database (or other application-specific group-like concepts). There is no standard for this, but some identity providers allow the definition of attribute mapping rules based on group membership. For example, in ADFS, you can create a claim rule that sets a specific SAML attribute to a specific value if and only if the user is a member of a specific group in AD. You would then set up such a rule and set a SAML attribute that your application understands to a value it understands.
Alternatively, if an application supports configuration of multiple IdPs, then you can configure one app / IdP mapping per group, and for each group add an attribute mapping rule with a hard-coded group name in an attribute that your application understands.