How can I defense from attackers who send junk data packet? - sockets

I wrote a TCP socket program,and define a text protocol format like: "length|content",
to make it simple, the "length" is always 1-byte-long and it define the number of bytes of "content"
My problem is:
when attackers send packets like "1|a51",it will stay in tcp's receive buffer
the program will parse it wrong and the next packet would start like "5|1XXXX",
then the rest of the packets remain in the buffer would all parsed wrong,
how to solve this problem?

If you get garbage, just close the connection. It's not your problem to figure out what they meant, if anything.

instead of length|content only, you also need to provide a checksum, if the checksum is not correct, you should drop the connection to avoid partial receive.
this is a typical problem in tcp protocol, since the tcp is stream based. but just as http, which is an application of tcp protocol, it has a structure of request / response to make sure each end of the connection knows when the data has been fully transferred.
but your scenario is a little bit tricky, since the hacker can only affect the connection of his own. while it cannot change the data from other connections, only if he can control the route / switcher between your application and the users.

Related

TCP/IP using Ada Sockets: How to correctly finish a packet? [duplicate]

This question already has answers here:
TCP Connection Seems to Receive Incomplete Data
(5 answers)
Closed 3 years ago.
I'm attempting to implement the Remote Frame Buffer protocol using Ada's Sockets library and I'm having trouble controlling the length of the packets that I'm sending.
I'm following the RFC 6143 specification (https://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc6143.pdf), see comments in the code for section numbers...
-- Section 7.1.1
String'Write (Comms, Protocol_Version);
Put_Line ("Server version: '"
& Protocol_Version (1 .. 11) & "'");
String'Read (Comms, Client_Version);
Put_Line ("Client version: '"
& Client_Version (1 .. 11) & "'");
-- Section 7.1.2
-- Server sends security types
U8'Write (Comms, Number_Of_Security_Types);
U8'Write (Comms, Security_Type_None);
-- client replies by selecting a security type
U8'Read (Comms, Client_Requested_Security_Type);
Put_Line ("Client requested security type: "
& Client_Requested_Security_Type'Image);
-- Section 7.1.3
U32'Write (Comms, Byte_Reverse (Security_Result));
-- Section 7.3.1
U8'Read (Comms, Client_Requested_Shared_Flag);
Put_Line ("Client requested shared flag: "
& Client_Requested_Shared_Flag'Image);
Server_Init'Write (Comms, Server_Init_Rec);
The problem seems to be (according to wireshark) that my calls to the various 'Write procedures are causing bytes to queue up on the socket without getting sent.
Consequently two or more packet's worth of data are being sent as one and causing malformed packets. Sections 7.1.2 and 7.1.3 are being sent consecutively in one packet instead of being broken into two.
I had wrongly assumed that 'Reading from the socket would cause the outgoing data to be flushed out, but that does not appear to be the case.
How do I tell Ada's Sockets library "this packet is finished, send it right now"?
To enphasize https://stackoverflow.com/users/207421/user207421 comment:
I'm not a protocols guru, but from my own experience, the usage of TCP (see RFC793) is often misunderstood.
The problem seems to be (according to wireshark) that my calls to the various 'Write procedures are causing bytes to queue up on the socket without getting sent.
Consequently two or more packet's worth of data are being sent as one and causing malformed packets. Sections 7.1.2 and 7.1.3 are being sent consecutively in one packet instead of being broken into two.
In short, TCP is not message-oriented.
Using TCP, sending/writing to socket results only append data to the TCP stream. The socket is free to send it in one exchange or several, and if you have lengthy data to send and message oriented protocol to implement on top of TCP, you may need to handle message reconstruction. Usually, an end of message special sequence of characters is added at the end of the message.
Processes transmit data by calling on the TCP and passing buffers of data as arguments. The TCP packages the data from these buffers into segments and calls on the internet module to transmit each segment to the destination TCP. The receiving TCP places the data from a segment into the receiving user's buffer and notifies the receiving user. The TCPs include control information in the segments which they use to ensure reliable ordered data transmission.
See also https://stackoverflow.com/a/11237634/7237062, quoting:
TCP is a stream-oriented connection, not message-oriented. It has no
concept of a message. When you write out your serialized string, it
only sees a meaningless sequence of bytes. TCP is free to break up
that stream up into multiple fragments and they will be received at
the client in those fragment-sized chunks. It is up to you to
reconstruct the entire message on the other end.
In your scenario, one would typically send a message length prefix.
This way, the client first reads the length prefix so it can then know
how large the incoming message is supposed to be.
or TCP Connection Seems to Receive Incomplete Data, quoting:
The recv function can receive as little as 1 byte, you may have to call it multiple times to get your entire payload. Because of this, you need to know how much data you're expecting. Although you can signal completion by closing the connection, that's not really a good idea.
Update:
I should also mention that the send function has the same conventions as recv: you have to call it in a loop because you cannot assume that it will send all your data. While it might always work in your development environment, that's the kind of assumption that will bite you later.

Ensure Completeness of HTTP Messages

I am currently working on an application that is supposed to get a web page and extract information from its content.
As I learned from my research (or as it seems to me at least), there is no ideal way to determine the end of an HTTP message.
Generally, I found two different ways to do so:
Set O_NONBLOCK flag for the socket and fetch data with recv() in a while loop. Assume that the message is complete and break if it occurs once that there are no bytes in the stream.
Rely on the HTTP Content-Length header and determine the end of the message with it.
Both ways don't seem to be completely safe to me. Solution (1) could possibly break the recv loop before the message was completed. On the other hand, solution (2) requires the Content-Length header to be set correctly.
What's the best way to proceed in this case? Can I always rely on the Content-Length header to be set?
Let me start here:
Can I always rely on the Content-Length header to be set?
No, you can't. Content-Length is an optional header. However, HTTP messages absolutely must feature a way to determine their body length if they are to be RFC-compliant (cf RFC7230, sec. 3.3.3). That being said, get ready to parse on chunked encoding whenever a content length isn't specified.
As for your original problem: Ensuring the completeness of a message is actually something that should be TCP's job. But as there are such complicated things like message pipelining around, it is best to check for two things in practice:
Have all reads from the network buffer been successful?
Is the number of the received bytes identical to the predicted message length?
Oh, and as #MartinJames noted, non-blocking probably isn't the best idea here.
The end of a HTTP response is defined:
By the final (empty) chunk in case Transfer-Encoding chunked is used.
By reaching the given length if a Content-length header is given and no chunked transfer encoding is used.
By the end of the TCP connection if neither chunked transfer encoding is used not Content-length is given.
In the first two cases you have a well defined end so you can verify that the data were fully received. Only in the last case (end of TCP connection) you don't know if the connection was closed before sending all the data. But usually you get either case 1 or case 2.
To make your life easier, you might want to provide
Connection: close
header when making HTTP request - than web-server will close connection after giving you the full page requested and you will not have to deal with chunks.
It is only a viable option if you only are interested in this single page, and will not request additional resources (script files, images, etc) - in latter case this will be a very inefficient solution for both your app and the server.

How do I decode a websocket packet?

I'm using Wireshark packet analyzer & when I filter for all "Websocket" packets I see what I am sending /receiving to the host. When I check individual packets mine always show as [MASKED], but you can 'Umask Payload' which shows the data in clear text that looks like this:
<IC sid="52ccc752-6080-4668-8f55-662020d83979" msqid="120l93l9l114l30l104"/>
However, if I 'Follow TCP stream & look at that same packet, the data shows up as encoded in some way like this:
....K#....../...y#..|...}...f...s...~...}...{G..r...kN.."G..z...r...'...'...z...d.
The problem is all Websocket packets I receive from the host come as encoded, it is NOT SSL & I can't figure out how to decode them, I have no idea what they are even encoded as (but yet my browser can decode it).
I assume that whatever method they are coming back to me as encoded data is the same method that my data is encoded when I use 'Follow TCP stream'.
Can someone please help me figure out how to decode the data the host is sending me? See host data below
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Client to server data is XORed with a mask (included in the dataframe). Some people suggest this is in order to throw off bad caching mechanisms responding to new websocket requests with server messages from older sessions. The masking makes sure that even messages containing identical data will appear differently to applications that do not understand websockets.
Also note that there are many different size options for the headers themselves.
Refer to RFC 6455 Section 5 which defines the masking/unmasking process for payloads sent from the client to the server.
https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6455
If you find any freeware VBA code to do the job of forming packets let me know! :-)

How is determining body length by closing connection reliable (RFC 2616 4.4.5)

I can't get one thing straight. The RFC 2616 in 4.4.5 states that Message Length can be determined "By the server closing the connection.".
This implies, that it is valid for a server to respond (e.g. returning a large image) with a response, that has no Content-Length in the header, but the client is supposed to keep fetching till the connection is closed and then assume all data has been downloaded.
But how is a client to know for sure that the connection was closed intentionally by the server? A server app could have crashed in the middle of sending the data and the server's OS would most likely send FIN packet to gracefully close the TCP connection with the client.
You are absolutely right, that mechanism is totally unreliable. This is covered in RFC 7230:
Since there is no way to distinguish a successfully completed,
close-delimited message from a partially received message interrupted
by network failure, a server SHOULD generate encoding or
length-delimited messages whenever possible. The close-delimiting
feature exists primarily for backwards compatibility with HTTP/1.0.
Fortunately most of HTTP traffic today are HTTP/1.1, with Content-Length or "Transfer-Encoding" to explicitly define the end of message.
The lesson is that, a message must have it own way of termination; we cannot repurpose the underlying transport layer's EOF as the message's EOF.
On that note, a (well-formed) html document, or a .gif, .avi etc, does define its own termination; we will know if we received an incomplete document. Therefore it is not so much of a problem to transmit it over HTTP/1.0 without Content-Length.
However, for plain text document, javascript, css etc. EOF is used to marked the end of the document, therefore it's problematic over HTTP/1.0.

Test Harness for a Clojure TCP Client

I'm writing a TCP client to connect, send messages to, and read responses from nodes on a busy network. I do not have access to code running on those nodes, so I have to sculpt the TCP messages I send out over the wire very carefully.
I've decided that I'm going to gather a bunch of live TCP data off of the network and use that as the basis for testing my client - given these input parameters, make sure that the transmitted binary renders into the hex I expect to see.
At this point I'm about to either fire up Wireshark and figure out how to filter for the packets that I'm sending or implement a really simple TCP server that waits for connections, spits the transmitted binary to disk (maybe processed to hex) and then test that I'm sending what I expect to send; neither of which feel like robust or professional solutions.
So: how would you recommend setting up a test harness for a TCP client to verify the right hex messages are coming out?
You should check out aleph for tcp and gloss for protocols. here is a tutorial and an example.
a simple tcp echo-server could be:
(defn echo-handler [ch client-info]
(siphon ch ch)) ;; a simple echo handler
(defn start-server [] (start-tcp-server
echo-handler
{:port 9997}))
(start-server)
gloss will be very useful at spitting the received messages either as hex dump or as values if you encode your protocol in it and use "decode".