Folks,
What is a simplest way to track consumer applications accessing RESTful API services inside department.
We do not restrict access - no authentication/authorization - open for invocation, trusted environment.
No tools like OAuth AuthZ servers or API management yet... but might be heading there at some point.
For now we thought to request consumers just to include some custom HTTP Header like X-Client-Id and log it on the server side for stats etc..
But knowing that in the future we might want to switch to more standard ways of doing things ... what would be best alternative to have to change less code in the future ?
Have the "clientId" in the Authorization: OAuth token (like access token)
Have JWT token in the Authorization header (looks too much - signing,base 64 etc for simple client id tracking ...)
Any ideas would be appreciated
We recently implemented this for one of our REST platforms and we used a combination of BOTH the points you mentioned, meaning Authorization header & JWT token. Although, JWT is ONLY for authentication and GETTING an access_token (oauth token) which is later used with calling actual resource apis. I will discuss how we handled this situation and you can decide on how you want to implement it.
1) Authentication
Client sends a JWT to your authentication service (/api/oauth2/auth). (If you want more reading on JWT, you can read here and here of how JWT is implemented by google and how you can use spring-security-jwt libary to handle all the signing and encrypting/decrypting). You get the "clientId" out of JWT after decrypting and verifying the signature and after server does all the authentication, you respond back with a 'refresh_token' and an 'access_token'. Server will save the access_token as well and map it to the clientId so that when client makes requests using access_token, you can know which client is making the request. The access_token expires in some time (ideally in an hour) and when it expires, the client uses the 'refresh_token' to get a new access token by posting refresh_token to some refresh token url (/api/oauth2/auth/token)
2) Authorization
Client takes the 'access_token' and uses the access token to make all the subsequent requests on all other apis (/api/*). Ideally, the access_token is sent as a part of the "Authorization" header. Server uses request filters (if you are using JAX-RS, you can use something like ContainerFilterRequest to add filters to specific url patterns and intercept them) to filter EACH request and parse out the Authorization header value. You will get the access_token from the header and from the access_token you can get the clientId that you mapped in step 1). You can do other authorization logic in the security filter and if everything goes through, you can use this information to LOG that clientId and the request that the client made.
This way you can kill 2 birds with one stone : Implement a security layer & log the information about customers (what calls they are making, how many time etc. etc.). In case you don't want to implement security filter just yet (as you mentioned it might be in the future), for now, the clients can just pass on the "clientId" (base64encoded or not, upto you) as a part of "Authorization" header. If all the calls are from a "trusted" network, it should be ok, although not as secure. This way, when you ACTUALLY implement a JWT and Oauth based security layer, all you have to do is change your ContainerFilterRequest logic to parse out access_token instead of client id (as mentioned in step # 2).
I hope this helps ! For more information on security filters you can have a look at this answer: Basic Authentication of a resource in Dropwizard. It says dropwizard, but it mostly talks about JAX-RS.
To implement full AuthN/AuthZ layer for consumer tracking would be an overkill for now.
We thought to use either to Authorzation header to pass custom client_id token:
Authorization: Custom <Client_Id>
or to use some limited version of JWT (no signatures as there no intent to validate them)
as access token
Authorization: JWT <JWT>
Where JWT could be:
{"alg":"none","typ":"JWT"}
{
"iss":"Client_ID",
"aud": REST Service URI,
"iat":1328550785
}
I do not see description of access_token format in the specification https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-1.4
Are there any contraints to use JWT as access token?
Related
Consider I'm creating a RESTful API (like Twitter API) and I need only a single key token to access the endpoint GET /messages.
The token needs to be sent via header access_token for example.
If I don't pass the token I'll get an 4xx error.
In the RESTful API scenario, is this all needed to protect against CSRF attacks? I mean, in RESTful APIs I'm not using Cookies to manager a user session, since the idea here is to not be a session (Stateless is one of the principles of REST).
Am I forgetting something or is this correct? I don't see why I would need a anti CSRF token besides my access token.
Thanks in advance!
Short answer: if your access_token is not a cookie, yes, it's enough to protect you against CSRF.
Long answer:
A CSRF attack can only happen when HTTP client automatically sends some authentication data(usually cookies) to server. The key point is attacker do not need to know the Cookie, it's is automatically sent if web user accesses 2 sites(your site and the attacker's site) using the same browser.
To anti CSRF, server sends to client a private token that browser does not automatically send it to server(so it's must not be a cookie). The developer has to write code to attach the token to each subsequent request.
CSRF is an issue for using Cookie by Web browser, if you are developing restful API that is not used by web browser, usually, you do not need to care about CSRF
#Bart Firstly CSRF attacks are usually from a trusted user. Which means that the client has successfully authenticated himself by maybe passing a valid token in case of a rest API. The attack could be by passing let's say a javascript which can change the state of a resource. So just having a single key token won't really help to avoid CSRF attacks.
Please refer to below URL for more reference on CSRF :-
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery
Most of the frameworks like Spring have inbuilt support for CSRF.
I am looking to build a web application using API-Centric architecture.
The frontend of the application would make requests to the REST API using AJAX.
The API is also used by other clients for various purposes. I'm of the opinion that the use of CSRF tokens may not be applicable to their implementation.
Other approaches include verifying the origin in the headers, but of course, headers can easily be spoofed.
How could I implement a robust CSRF prevention strategy for this application?
Some proposition: First You can use api-url like GET api/gime-csrf which return CSRF token as response and also set it in http-only cookie (so JS has no access to it - but remember to block TRACE request in server to prevent XST attack). Then when you make some "save state" request like POST/PUT/PATCH - you just put CSRF in some request header - and in server you compare header token value with cookie token value.
I am developing a REST application with its own authentication and authorization mechanism. I want to use JSON Web Tokens for authentication. Is the following a valid and safe implementation?
A REST API will be developed to accept username and password and do the authentication. The HTTP method to be used is POST so that there is no caching. Also, there will be SSL for security at the time of transit
At the time of authentication, two JWTs will be created - access token and refresh token. Refresh token will have longer validity. Both the tokens will be written in cookies, so that they are sent in every subsequent requests
On every REST API call, the tokens will be retrieved from the HTTP header. If the access token is not expired, check the privileges of the user and allow access accordingly. If the access token is expired but the refresh token is valid, recreate new access token and refresh token with new expiry dates (do all necessary checks to ensure that the user rights to authenticate are not revoked) and sent back through Cookies
Provide a logout REST API that will reset the cookie and hence subsequent API calls will be rejected until login is done.
My understanding of refresh token here is:
Due to the presence of refresh token, we can keep shorter validity period for access token and check frequently (at the expiry of access token) that the user is still authorized to login.
Please correct me if I am wrong.
A REST API will be developed to accept username and password and do
the authentication. The HTTP method to be used is POST so that there
is no caching. Also, there will be SSL for security at the time of
transit
This is the way most do it, so you're good here.
At the time of authentication, two JWTs will be created - access token
and refresh token. Refresh token will have longer validity. Both the
tokens will be written in cookies so that they are sent in every
subsequent requests
Storing the tokens in cookies I not dangerous in itself, but if you somehow get you JWT module on your server to read them from there you vulnerable to CSRF attacks where any webpage can trigger a users browser to send a form + you sites cookie to your server unless you use CSRF tokens. So generally they are stored in localStorage and "manually" added to request headers every time.
On every REST API call, the tokens will be retrieved from the HTTP
header. If the access token is not expired, check the privileges of
the user and allow access accordingly. If the access token is expired
but the refresh token is valid, recreate new access token and refresh
token with new expiry dates (do all necessary checks to ensure that
the user rights to authenticate are not revoked) and sent back through
Cookies
Apart from the cookie dangers, it seems safe.
Provide a logout REST API that will reset the cookie and hence
subsequent API calls will be rejected until login is done.
You don't even need to make an API call, you can simply just purge the cookies or the localStorage object and make sure your client doesn't break on missing tokens.
The standard for the express-jwt module expects the tokens to be in its own "Authorization: Bearer [Token]" header, which I would strongly recommend over cookies. The localStorage API is available all the way back to IE8 so you should be good.
Edit:
First, it's important to know the difference between XSS and CSRF attacks since they're often believed to be the same thing.
XSS is when users get unsafe JS running on your domain in other users browsers when that happens neither JWT in localStorage or sessions and JWT in cookies are safe. With httpOnly flag on cookies, you can't directly access them, but the browser will still send them with AJAX requests to your server. If this happens you generally out of luck. To prevent this, make sure to escape all user input if it's sent to the browser.
If you load 3rd party JS with script tags or iframes this might compromise localStorage unless you are careful, but I haven't worked enough with this to help you here.
CSRF is only when other domains are trying to send normal HTML forms to your server by getting the browser to send cookies automatically. Frameworks prevent this by inserting unique random strings as hidden fields and checking them again when it's submitted. JWT's in localStorage is safe from this since each domain gets its own separate localStorage area.
But ultimately all this depends on if your service will be using one single domain, in which case httpOnly cookies will be plenty secure and easier to set up, but if you wanna spread your service out on multiple domains like api.domain.com + app.domain.com or add a native app you're forced to store you're JWTs in localStorage or some other native storage area.
Hope this helps!
I asked this question two years back and also accepted the answer. However, based on my experience and study in the last two years, I'd like to answer this just in case someone stumbles on this thread with the same question.
The approach mentioned in the question is similar to the "Resource Owner Password Credentials" grant type of OAuth 2.0. However, I think it is better to use the "Authorization Code Grant" type instead and Cookie to store the tokens instead of browser localStorage or sessionStorage. I have detailed my reasons, implementation points, security considerations and references in this StackOverlow answer.
Like OP I been using resource owner password grant.
I learned so much from Saptarshi Basu's other answer in a different post I think anyone looking into OAuth Code Flow should take a look at it, it has outlined a very solid approach to auth SPA and resource servers. It primarily relies on your backend(resource server) to handle authentication with the auth provider as a private client.
However, I will just add that people looking at implementing authentication with SPA should also consider OAuth Code Flow with PKCE. The main goal of PKCE is to allow public client such as SPA to authenticate directly with auth provider. All PKCE adds, is that when a SPA app initiates authentication, a hashed value is sent to the auth provider when the user is authenticated. And after user authenticate with the authorization provider, it redirects the user back to SPA with that hashed value as well as authorization code. Now, for the next part where the SPA calls auth provider to exchange code for tokens, instead of providing client secret, it has to provide the key that was originally used to create the hashed value. This mechanism guarantees the code cannot be used by someone who intercepted the code, and the SPA doesnt need to store a client secret like a server-side app does.
Now the only thing I'm not certain at this point is which is technically more secure, server-side authentication using standard Code Flow without PKCE or SPA authenticating directly using PKCE? Most resources I could find online currently describes and recommends the latter . However I feel that letting a private server side client handle authentication (as Saptarshi Basu described) might still be more secure. I would love to hear his opinion on this as well.
My understanding of refresh token here is:
Due to the presence of refresh token, we can keep shorter validity period for access token and check frequently (at the expiry of access token) that the user is still authorized to login.
Please correct me if I am wrong.
Assuming you're talking about using JWT as Bearer-token in OAuth (and I would strongly advice to follow the OAuth 2.0 protocol), that's right.
With an additional auth-time (timestamp of authentication) claim in your JWT, you could even drop the second token and sent your access- as a refresh-token (the auth-server could then issue a new access-token if token is valid & auth-time within allowed range)... but sure, it's also good to follow the standard ;)
Anyway, there are certain additional aspects (that tend to get difficult or are even against the fundamental ideas of JWT) you should consider before using JWTs as refresh-token, as this basically means you introduce long-living JWT:
do you need to have something like forced user logout/ token revocation by subject (e.g. if user got identified as fraudulent)?
do you need to have something like revocation of a specific token (e.g. if a user looses a device)?
...
Dependent on your use-case you should consider all the possible implications, long-living tokens have as they usually require you to introduce some kind of state on your server-side (e.g. to allow revocation/ blacklisting). Keep in mind the beauty and security of the JWT concept lies within JWTs being short-lived.
Overview
I am developing a mobile application using PhoneGap with REST API for the backend. The REST API won't be utilised by third-party developers, but will be application-specific, so there is no need for oAuth to be implemented. Hence, I am planning to use Basic Authentication where in the User enters their Username/password to access the API resources. All API communication will be on SSL.
Basic Authentication with Token
Instead of letting the application store the username/password and send it with every request to the API, I would rather authenticate username/password on the first login request and send a GUID token back. The client stores this GUID token and sends the token back to the API with each request through the Authorization header, like this:
Authorization: Basic e1d9753f-a508-46cc-a428-1787595d63e4
On the server side, the username/GUID combination will be stored on the server with a expiration date along with device settings. This will allow to keep track of the number of devices a user has logged in from as well as expire the session once the Guid has reached expiration.
Does this approach sound reasonable and secure?
There is no need for you to create custom headers or authentication schemes at all.
The Bearer authentication scheme is designed exactly for your use case:
Authorization: Bearer e1d9753f-a508-46cc-a428-1787595d63e4
Basic authentication must be as follows:
Authorization: Basic base64EncodedUsernameAndPassword
where base64EncodedUsernameAndPassword is equal to the output of:
base_64_encode(username + ':' + raw_password)
Do not use Basic if the trailing text value is not the above exact algorithm.
If you just want to put whatever value you want after the scheme name, use the Bearer scheme - that is what it was invented for.
Warning
While you can use a simple GUID/UUID as your token, this isn't really a secure token. Consider using a JWT instead. JWTs can be digitally signed and assigned a TTL so that only the server setting it can a) create it and validate its authenticity and b) ensure it is not used longer than is allowed. While this may be true of your data stored based on the GUID, the JWT approach does not require server state - so it scales far better - and accomplishes the same thing.
The general "Authentication with Token" approach is very good but you shouldn't try to make Basic Authentication work in different way than it is supposed to (after all it is a defined standard). You should rather use your own header for authentication purposes. You can find a very good description of such scenario here:
Making your ASP.NET Web API’s secure
I'm building a picture diary on web application google app engine using python. Users can sign up and post pictures to their diary.
Also, I'm trying to conform as much as I can to the REST architecture of doing things.
The authentication scheme is based like this for the web application:
1. Post username/password from the frontend
2. Backend sets up a cookie if authentication is successful
3. The rest of the AJAX calls made are authenticated using this cookie.
Is there any way to conform to REST without using cookies ?
Now, I'm also building an android application where users can sign in and post/view their picture diary. I need to expose the data from web application's datastore so I'll be building a webservice to fetch data from the datastore.
The authentication scheme for the android client:
OPTION a
1. Post username/password over https to the web service
2. Web service returns a unique authorization token (store the token in the username/pwd table on the datastore)
3. Request subsequent services by adding this token to the Request Header of the request
4. Server maps the token to the username/pwd table and returns data if token is found
5. Authorization token expires after a certain period of time
OPTION b
1. Set up a secret key on the client and server side
2. Use "username:hash of password and secret key" in the authorization header of every request
3. server generates the password by extracting the password from the hash value using the same hash algorithm ; if successful returns data
btw, I didn't wanna use basic authorization because of its security vulnerabilities.
Which is better ?
Are there other significantly better ways to accomplish what I'm trying to do ? Security is quite a concern for me btw.
I'd appreciate if anyone has any insight into this issue. thanks.
I've been doing some research myself as to what would be the best solution. I think the 2-legged oauth might work in my case as Leonm suggested.
In this case the server has to provide the client with a consumer key/secret which in my case is hardcoded in the app.
The steps now would be:
1. Generate a signature using the oauth_parameters(consumer_key, signature_method, timestamp), request url, request parameters, and the SECRET.
2. Include the signature, oauth parameters when making a request.
3. Server verifies the request by generating the signature again except in this case it uses the SECRET that corresponds to the key
I think this way I am pretty much confirming to the REST principles. The server is statless as I far I understand now.
What are the pros/cons on doing things this way?
If "security is a concern" then I would say that you'd be a lot better off using open standards and a library to achieve what you want. The main reason for this is that if you do it yourself, you're very likely to forget something; these standards have had a lot of eyes looking at them, looking for holes.
Your options include (in increasing level of complexity)
Basic authentication and HTTPS
Everything is encrypted, which makes it impossible to compress or look into, it increases the overhead somewhat, using more horsepower on the server, and more perhaps battery power on the client. Simple to implement, since it's well supported by libraries.
Digest authentication
Unencrypted messages pass the wire, but the authentication is securely managed in the Authorization headers. See the wikipedia entry for more information.
OAuth
See how Google is providing OAuth for installed applications. I believe it isn't what you're looking for, since you're not asking to share data between applications, just authenticating users.
Roll your own
If you want to roll your own, I suggest looking at e.g. how Google's (now deprecated ?) ClientLogin used to work.
Clients would GET a protected resource, and get a 401 with instructions to perform a GoogleLogin authentication, including a URI for where to perform the login itself
Clients (knowing how to do this) POST a request in a specific manner to that URI
The server responds with a specific response including a (long) token
The client can now perform GET requests to the protected resource with that token.
Statelessness
You cite REST, which dictates that requests should not specifically depend on prior interaction: "... each request from client to server must contain all of the information necessary to understand the request, and cannot take advantage of any stored context on the server." (fielding) This means that a server shouldn't store conversational context (like an authentication token) in a table.
One way of fixing this is by using any of the token based approaches (where the server tells the client about a token it should use for future requests) where the token is not a random number, but a message to the server itself. To protect yourself from client tampering, it can be signed, and if you're afraid of clients looking at it, you can encrypt it.
Edit: Although I'm not certain, it seems unlikely that Google has a table of all authentication tokens ever issued; The length of their tokens suggests that the token is some encrypted message proving that whoever holds this token actually provided real credentials in some realm at some time.
OAuth does exactly what you want to do in a standard way.
You could use a combination of HTTPS and HTTP Basic Auth. Both are existing standards and should be secure enough when used together.