The normal MO for creating items in a database is to let the database control the generation of the primary key (id). That's usually true whether you're using auto-incremented integer ids or UUIDs.
I'm building a clientside app (Angular but the tech is irrelevant) that I want to be able to build offline behaviour into. In order to allow allow offline object creation (and association) I need the the client appplication to generate primary keys for new objects. This is both to allow for associations with other objects created offline and also to allow for indempotence (making sure I don't accidentally save the same object to the server twice due to a network issue).
The challenge though is what happens when that object gets sent to the server. Do you use a temporary clientside ID which you then replace with the ID that the server subsequently generates or you use some sort of ID translation layer between the client and the server - this is what Trello did when building their offline functionality.
However, it occurred to me that there may be a third way. I'm using UUIDs for all tables on the back end. And so this made me realise that I could in theory insert a UUID into the back end that was generated on the front end. The whole point of UUIDs is that they're universally unique so the front end doesn't need to know the server state to generate one. In the unlikely event that they do collide then the uniqueness criteria on the server would prevent a duplicate.
Is this a legitimate approach? The risk seems to be 1. Collisions and 2. any form of security that I haven't anticipated. Collisons seem to be taken care of by the way that UUIDs are generated but I can't tell if there are risks in allowing a client to choose the ID of an inserted object.
However, it occurred to me that there may be a third way. I'm using UUIDs for all tables on the back end. And so this made me realise that I could in theory insert a UUID into the back end that was generated on the front end. The whole point of UUIDs is that they're universally unique so the front end doesn't need to know the server state to generate one. In the unlikely event that they do collide then the uniqueness criteria on the server would prevent a duplicate.
Yes, this is fine. Postgres even has a UUID type.
Set the default ID to be a server-generated UUID if the client does not send one.
Collisions.
UUIDs are designed to not collide.
Any form of security that I haven't anticipated.
Avoid UUIDv1 because...
This involves the MAC address of the computer and a time stamp. Note that UUIDs of this kind reveal the identity of the computer that created the identifier and the time at which it did so, which might make it unsuitable for certain security-sensitive applications.
You can instead use uuid_generate_v1mc which obscures the MAC address.
Avoid UUIDv3 because it uses MD5. Use UUIDv5 instead.
UUIDv4 is simplest, it's a 122 bit random number, and built into Postgres (the others are in the commonly available uuid-osp extension). However, it depends on the strength of the random number generator of each client. But even a bad UUIDv4 generator is better than incrementing an integer.
I have easily guessable internal identifiers (auto increasing numbers) and I'd like to give my clients access to resources based on these identifiers.
Of cause I cannot provide them with an URL like:
https://example.com/order/13
because they could easily guess how to access order #14 from this URL.
I therefore thought about providing them with a salted hash of the identifier like:
https://example.com/order/4643ef…
where
4643ef… = sha256(13 + 'supersecretsalt')
Is this a good approach from a security perspective?
First of all, your should not be granting access to any resource simply based on a uri. In other words, user A should not be able to access a resource that belongs to user B even if he knows the relevant uri. To mitigate this, you should add some form of authentication and authorization before allowing access to any (confidential?) resources.
That said, if you'd still like to obfuscate the uri, you can probably use a GUID for this instead of generating any kind of hash. Instead, fore each order ID, simply store a GUID together with it, and then look that ID up whenever the GUID is used in an url.
Sidenote: If you do want to let your customers look up some order-details based simply on a url (i.e. without requiring identification), you might at least make the availability of the resource temporary. You can do this by storing e.g. a valid until-date together with the GUID.
Now user A will be able to see info relating to his resource via a url with a guid, but perhaps only for e.g. 3 days. Other users would also be able to access it, but it would be less likely to happen, both because it would be hard to guess the GUID, and because they would only have a 3 day window to do so.
If user A needs to access his resource again later, perhaps you could provide a way to extend the validity of the GUID, or alternatively just provide a new GUID that points to the same resource, but with a different validity date.
Obviously you'll need to thing through whether or not this is realistic / acceptable for your particular situation and security needs.
In our system we have accounts which contain items. An item is always associated with a single account but also has a globally unique id in the system. Sometimes it is desirable to work with an item when only its id is known.
Is it incorrect to allow access to a subordinate resource (the item) from outside it's owner (the account)? In other words, is it wrong to have 2 URI's to the same resource? This is a little tricky to explain so here is an example:
POST /inventory/accountId
#Request Body contains new item
#Response body contains new item's id
GET|PUT|DELETE /inventory/accountId/guid #obviously works and makes sense
GET|PUT|DELETE /inventory/guid #does this make sense?
Perhaps I should rethink my resource layout and not use accounts to create items but instead take the account as a query string parameter or field on the item?
POST /inventory
# Request body contains item w/ account name set on it
GET|POST|DELETE /inventory/uuid #makes sense
GET|POST|DELETE /inventory/accountId/uuid #not allowed
I think having two URIs point to the same item is asking for trouble. In my experience, these sorts of things lead to craziness as you scale out (caching, multiple nodes in a cluster going out of sync and so on). As long as the item's ID is indeed globally unique, there's no reason no to simply refer to it as /inventory/uid
POST /inventory/accountId
GET|PUT|DELETE /inventory/accountId/guid #obviously works and makes sense
GET|PUT|DELETE /inventory/guid #does this make sense?
It makes the most sense when /inventory/guid redirects to /inventory/accountId/guid (or, I'd argue, vice-versa). Having a single canonical entity, with multiple URI's redirecting to it, allows your caching scheme to remain the most straightforward. If the two URI's instead return the same data, then a user is inevitably going to PUT a new representation to one and then be confused when it GETs an old copy from the other because the cache was only invalidated for the former. A similar problem can occur for subsequent GETs on the two. Redirects keep that a lot cleaner (not perfectly synchronous, but cleaner).
Whether to make items subordinate to accounts depends on whether items can exist without an account. If the data of an item is a subset of the data of an account, then go ahead and make it subordinate. If you find that an account is just one kind of container, or that some items exist without any container, then promote them to the top level.
In other words, is it wrong to have 2 URI's to the same resource?
No. It is not wrong to have multiple URI's identifying the same resource. I don't see anything wrong with your first approach as well. Remember URI's are unique identifiers and should be opaque to clients. If they are uniquely identifying a resource then you don't have to worry too much about making your URLs look pretty. I am not saying resource modeling is not important but IMO we shouldn't spend too much time on it. If your business needs that you have guid directly under inventory and also under individual accounts, so be it.
Are you concerned about this because of a potential security hole in letting data be available to unauthorized users? Or is your concern purely design driven?
If security is not your concern, I agree that it is perfectly fine to have 2 URIS pointing to the same resource.
document/show?id=4cf8ce8a8aad6957ff00005b
Generally I think you should be cautious to expose internals (such as DB ids) to the client. The URL can easily be manipulated and the user has possibly access to objects you don't want him to have.
For MongoDB in special, the object ID might even reveal some additional internals (see here), i.e. they aren't completely random. That might be an issue too.
Besides that, I think there's no reason not to use the id.
I generally agree with #MartinStettner's reply. I wanted to add a few points, mostly elaborating what he said. Yes, a small amount of information is decodeable from the ObjectId. This is trivially accessible if someone recognizes this as a MongoDB ObjectID. The two downsides are:
It might allow someone to guess a different valid ObjectId, and request that object.
It might reveal info about the record (such as its creation date) or the server that you didn't want someone to have.
The "right" fix for the first item is to implement some sort of real access control: 1) a user has to login with a username and password, 2) the object is associated with that username, 3) the app only serves objects to a user that are associated with that username.
MongoDB doesn't do that itself; you'll have to rely on other means. Perhaps your web-app framework, and/or some ad-hoc access control list (which itself could be in MongoDB).
But here is a "quick fix" that mostly solves both problems: create some other "id" for the record, based on a large, high-quality random number.
How large does "large" need to be? A 128-bit random number has 3.4 * 10^38 possible values. So if you have 10,000,000 objects in your database, someone guessing a valid value is a vanishingly small probability: 1 in 3.4 * 10^31. Not good enough? Use a 256-bit random number... or higher!
How to represent this number in the document? You could use a string (encoding the number as hex or base64), or MongoDB's binary type. (Consult your driver's API docs to figure out how to created a binary object as part of a document.)
While you could add a new field to your document to hold this, then you'd probably also want an index. So the document size is bigger, and you spend more memory on that index. Here's what you might not have though of: simply USE that "truly random id" as your documents "_id" field. Thus the per-document size is only a little higher, and you use the index that you [probably] had there anyways.
I can set both the 128 character session string and other collection document object ids as cookies and when user visits do a asynchronous fetch where I fetch the session, user and account all at once. Instead of fetching the session first and then after fetching user, account. If the session document is valid ill share the user and account documents.
If I do this I'll have to make every single request for a user and account document require the session 128 character session cookie to be fetched too thus making exposing the user and account object id safer. It means if anyone is guessing a user ID or account ID, they also have to guess the 128 string to get any answers from the system.
Another security measure you could do is wrap the id is some salt which you only know the positioning such as
XXX4cf8ce8XXXXa8aad6957fXXXXXXXf00005bXXXX
Now you know exactly how to slice that up to get the ID.
I'm writing an app which main purpose is to keep list of users
purchases.
I would like to ensure that even I as a developer (or anyone with full
access to the database) could not figure out how much money a
particular person has spent or what he has bought.
I initially came up with the following scheme:
--------------+------------+-----------
user_hash | item | price
--------------+------------+-----------
a45cd654fe810 | Strip club | 400.00
a45cd654fe810 | Ferrari | 1510800.00
54da2241211c2 | Beer | 5.00
54da2241211c2 | iPhone | 399.00
User logs in with username and password.
From the password calculate user_hash (possibly with salting etc.).
Use the hash to access users data with normal SQL-queries.
Given enough users, it should be almost impossible to tell how much
money a particular user has spent by just knowing his name.
Is this a sensible thing to do, or am I completely foolish?
I'm afraid that if your application can link a person to its data, any developer/admin can.
The only thing you can do is making it harder to do the link, to slow the developer/admin, but if you make it harder to link users to data, you will make it harder for your server too.
Idea based on #no idea :
You can have a classic user/password login to your application (hashed password, or whatever), and a special "pass" used to keep your data secure. This "pass" wouldn't be stored in your database.
When your client log in your application I would have to provide user/password/pass. The user/password is checked with the database, and the pass would be used to load/write data.
When you need to write data, you make a hash of your "username/pass" couple, and store it as a key linking your client to your data.
When you need to load data, you make a hash of your "username/pass" couple, and load every data matching this hash.
This way it's impossible to make a link between your data and your user.
In another hand, (as I said in a comment to #no) beware of collisions. Plus if your user write a bad "pass" you can't check it.
Update : For the last part, I had another idea, you can store in your database a hash of your "pass/password" couple, this way you can check if your "pass" is okay.
Create a users table with:
user_id: an identity column (auto-generated id)
username
password: make sure it's hashed!
Create a product table like in your example:
user_hash
item
price
The user_hash will be based off of user_id which never changes. Username and password are free to change as needed. When the user logs in, you compare username/password to get the user_id. You can send the user_hash back to the client for the duration of the session, or an encrypted/indirect version of the hash (could be a session ID, where the server stores the user_hash in the session).
Now you need a way to hash the user_id into user_hash and keep it protected.
If you do it client-side as #no suggested, the client needs to have user_id. Big security hole (especially if it's a web app), hash can be easily be tampered with and algorithm is freely available to the public.
You could have it as a function in the database. Bad idea, since the database has all the pieces to link the records.
For web sites or client/server apps you could have it on your server-side code. Much better, but then one developer has access to the hashing algorithm and data.
Have another developer write the hashing algorithm (which you don't have access to) and stick in on another server (which you also don't have access to) as a TCP/web service. Your server-side code would then pass the user ID and get a hash back. You wouldn't have the algorithm, but you can send all the user IDs through to get all their hashes back. Not a lot of benefits to #3, though the service could have logging and such to try to minimize the risk.
If it's simply a client-database app, you only have choices #1 and 2. I would strongly suggest adding another [business] layer that is server-side, separate from the database server.
Edit:
This overlaps some of the previous points. Have 3 servers:
Authentication server: Employee A has access. Maintains user table. Has web service (with encrypted communications) that takes user/password combination. Hashes password, looks up user_id in table, generates user_hash. This way you can't simply send all user_ids and get back the hashes. You have to have the password which isn't stored anywhere and is only available during authentication process.
Main database server: Employee B has access. Only stores user_hash. No userid, no passwords. You can link the data using the user_hash, but the actual user info is somewhere else.
Website server: Employee B has access. Gets login info, passes to authentication server, gets hash back, then disposes login info. Keeps hash in session for writing/querying to the database.
So Employee A has user_id, username, password and algorithm. Employee B has user_hash and data. Unless employee B modifies the website to store the raw user/password, he has no way of linking to the real users.
Using SQL profiling, Employee A would get user_id, username and password hash (since user_hash is generated later in code). Employee B would get user_hash and data.
Keep in mind that even without actually storing the person's identifying information anywhere, merely associating enough information all with the same key could allow you to figure out the identity of the person associated with certain information. For a simple example, you could call up the strip club and ask which customer drove a Ferrari.
For this reason, when you de-identify medical records (for use in research and such), you have to remove birthdays for people over 89 years old (because people that old are rare enough that a specific birthdate could point to a single person) and remove any geographic coding that specifies an area containing fewer than 20,000 people. (See http://privacy.med.miami.edu/glossary/xd_deidentified_health_info.htm)
AOL found out the hard way when they released search data that people can be identified just by knowing what searches are associated with an anonymous person. (See http://www.fi.muni.cz/kd/events/cikhaj-2007-jan/slides/kumpost.pdf)
The only way to ensure that the data can't be connected to the person it belongs to is to not record the identity information in the first place (make everything anonymous). Doing this, however, would most likely make your app pointless. You can make this more difficult to do, but you can't make it impossible.
Storing user data and identifying information in separate databases (and possibly on separate servers) and linking the two with an ID number is probably the closest thing that you can do. This way, you have isolated the two data sets as much as possible. You still must retain that ID number as a link between them; otherwise, you would be unable to retrieve a user's data.
In addition, I wouldn't recommend using a hashed password as a unique identifier. When a user changes their password, you would then have to go through and update all of your databases to replace the old hashed password IDs with the new ones. It is usually much easier to use a unique ID that is not based on any of the user's information (to help ensure that it will stay static).
This ends up being a social problem, not a technological problem. The best solutions will be a social solution. After hardening your systems to guard against unauthorized access (hackers, etc), you will probably get better mileage working on establishing trust with your users and implementing a system of policies and procedures regarding data security. Include specific penalties for employees who misuse customer information. Since a single breach of customer trust is enough to ruin your reputation and drive all of your users away, the temptation of misusing this data by those with "top-level" access is less than you might think (since the collapse of the company usually outweighs any gain).
The problem is that if someone already has full access to the database then it's just a matter of time before they link up the records to particular people. Somewhere in your database (or in the application itself) you will have to make the relation between the user and the items. If someone has full access, then they will have access to that mechanism.
There is absolutely no way of preventing this.
The reality is that by having full access we are in a position of trust. This means that the company managers have to trust that even though you can see the data, you will not act in any way on it. This is where little things like ethics come into play.
Now, that said, a lot of companies separate the development and production staff. The purpose is to remove Development from having direct contact with live (ie:real) data. This has a number of advantages with security and data reliability being at the top of the heap.
The only real drawback is that some developers believe they can't troubleshoot a problem without production access. However, this is simply not true.
Production staff then would be the only ones with access to the live servers. They will typically be vetted to a larger degree (criminal history and other background checks) that is commiserate with the type of data you have to protect.
The point of all this is that this is a personnel problem; and not one that can truly be solved with technical means.
UPDATE
Others here seem to be missing a very important and vital piece of the puzzle. Namely, that the data is being entered into the system for a reason. That reason is almost universally so that it can be shared. In the case of an expense report, that data is entered so that accounting can know who to pay back.
Which means that the system, at some level, will have to match users and items without the data entry person (ie: a salesperson) being logged in.
And because that data has to be tied together without all parties involved standing there to type in a security code to "release" the data, then a DBA will absolutely be able to review the query logs to figure out who is who. And very easily I might add regardless of how many hash marks you want to throw into it. Triple DES won't save you either.
At the end of the day all you've done is make development harder with absolutely zero security benefit. I can't emphasize this enough: the only way to hide data from a dba would be for either 1. that data to only be accessible by the very person who entered it or 2. for it to not exist in the first place.
Regarding option 1, if the only person who can ever access it is the person who entered it.. well, there is no point for it to be in a corporate database.
It seems like you're right on track with this, but you're just over thinking it (or I simply don't understand it)
Write a function that builds a new string based on the input (which will be their username or something else that cant change overtime)
Use the returned string as a salt when building the user hash (again I would use the userID or username as an input for the hash builder because they wont change like the users' password or email)
Associate all user actions with the user hash.
No one with only database access can determine what the hell the user hashes mean. Even an attempt at brute forcing it by trying different seed, salt combinations will end up useless because the salt is determined as a variant of the username.
I think you've answered you own question with your initial post.
Actually, there's a way you could possibly do what you're talking about...
You could have the user type his name and password into a form that runs a purely client-side script which generates a hash based on the name and pw. That hash is used as a unique id for the user, and is sent to the server. This way the server only knows the user by hash, not by name.
For this to work, though, the hash would have to be different from the normal password hash, and the user would be required to enter their name / password an additional time before the server would have any 'memory' of what that person bought.
The server could remember what the person bought for the duration of their session and then 'forget', because the database would contain no link between the user accounts and the sensitive info.
edit
In response to those who say hashing on the client is a security risk: It's not if you do it right. It should be assumed that a hash algorithm is known or knowable. To say otherwise amounts to "security through obscurity." Hashing doesn't involve any private keys, and dynamic hashes could be used to prevent tampering.
For example, you take a hash generator like this:
http://baagoe.com/en/RandomMusings/javascript/Mash.js
// From http://baagoe.com/en/RandomMusings/javascript/
// Johannes Baagoe <baagoe#baagoe.com>, 2010
function Mash() {
var n = 0xefc8249d;
var mash = function(data) {
data = data.toString();
for (var i = 0; i < data.length; i++) {
n += data.charCodeAt(i);
var h = 0.02519603282416938 * n;
n = h >>> 0;
h -= n;
h *= n;
n = h >>> 0;
h -= n;
n += h * 0x100000000; // 2^32
}
return (n >>> 0) * 2.3283064365386963e-10; // 2^-32
};
mash.version = 'Mash 0.9';
return mash;
}
See how n changes, each time you hash a string you get something different.
Hash the username+password using a normal hash algo. This will be the same as the key of the 'secret' table in the database, but will match nothing else in the database.
Append the hashed pass to the username and hash it with the above algorithm.
Base-16 encode var n and append it in the original hash with a delimiter character.
This will create a unique hash (will be different each time) which can be checked by the system against each column in the database. The system can be set up be allow a particular unique hash only once (say, once a year), preventing MITM attacks, and none of the user's information is passed across the wire. Unless I'm missing something, there is nothing insecure about this.