I have a small question related to granting access to multiple sites in Sitecore 7.5.
Let's say I have a website named as website_1 and another website named as website_2 in my Sitecore environment. Now I have created two roles. One role named as r_website_1 gives access to website_1 and another role r_website_2 gives access to website_2.
In r_website_1, only access to website_1 is granted and access to website_2 is denied. The same goes for r_website_2 but for
website_2.
Now I want to give read and write access to user_1 for both websites. What I did was went to User Manager>user_1>Edit>Member Of and then assigned both roles.
What I noticed that the user_1 only gets access to one website. it seems that both roles are countering each another. For example, the denied permission for website_2 in r_website_1 is conflicting with allowed permission for website_2 in r_website_2.
May I know what's the fix for this problem?
Thanks in advance,
Vaibhav
Deny permission always has priority. You cannot remove by simply adding another role with allow access rights.
Instead of using deny you should break the inheritance of chosen access right for the role1 for site2 and similarly for the role2 for site1.
Here is a quote from Sitecore Administrator Security Cookbook:
We recommend that you use inheritance whenever possible to limit the access that roles have to the items in Sitecore. Using inheritance instead of directly denying access rights to items makes it easier to manage the security system.
And you can read about breaking inheritance of access rights in Assign access rights to a security account document.
Related
I have a tenant admin account for a SharePoint online tenant. I am tasked with looking at all the sites on the tenant and all the SharePoint groups on each site. Getting a list of sites is easy using PNP libraries (Get-PnPTenantSite). My next step is to loop through each site and get all the security groups associated with each site - also easy using Get-PnPGroup commandlet.
The problem I'm running into is that my tenant admin is not added to some sites - not Site Admin, Not Site Owner, not even Site Reader - and so when my script executes against one of these sites, I'm getting a 403 Forbidden when asking for the groups on the site. Yes, I could avoid this by just adding my tenant admin as an owner on every single site in the tenant, and could probably even do this using a fairly simple powershell script.
However, my question is, why is this necessary? Shouldn't I be able to just run a script with some kind of "tenant admin super-read-permissions" or something that will just temporarily give me all access to everything without having to go through the middle step of adding myself everywhere?
Depending on the needs of your business with SharePoint, it may seem like an unnecessary or extra layer of security. After all, why not allow an administrator to access all the things?
The answer lies in the fact that SharePoint security is designed to allow separation of roles. These roles may not necessarily match exactly how responsibilities are defined in your company.
From Microsoft:
Global Administrators and SharePoint Administrators don't have
automatic access to all sites and each user's OneDrive, but they can
give themselves access to any site or OneDrive.
See https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sharepoint/sharepoint-admin-role
Tenant admins have several responsibilities:
Create sites
Delete sites
Manage sharing settings at the organization level
Add and remove site admins
Manage site storage limits
To perform these responsibilities, very little access to the actual sites and their content is required.
Management of access to a site collection and its content is the responsibility of the site collection administrator and site owners.
It sounds like in your company, you wear both hats. You might be creating and deleting sites, and also getting involved in access control or auditing at the site collection level. In these cases, you must use the privilege of the tenant admin (e.g., add and remove site admins) to grant yourself the site collection privileges required to access the information you need.
I recommend not granting yourself these privileges forever. It is helpful to consider that having constant administrative access to all sites is undesirable for a few reasons. For instance:
Search is supposed to be filtered to content that is relevant to the user. If the user is an admin with access to all content, search will not be filtered in a useful way.
While an administrator may certainly grant themselves access to a site, some collaborators would prefer that their content remain private to their team until or unless they require technical support.
All of this addresses the "why" part of your question. As for the technical question, there is currently no "tenant admin super-read-permissions" role that you can use for the data you want to collect.
You all are familiar with the ability to share a Google Doc with certain people, and provide those people with the ability to view, or edit.
I'm trying to understand how such an architecture would be organized in a REST Api.
For instance, for my document I want to grant read access to:
myself
some#email.com
users who belong to domain.com (everybody who belong to my network)
I'd like to give write access to:
myself
another#email.com
In addition, users with the role of admin also have write access regardless of the permission I define, and users with the role moderator have read access regardless of the permission I define.
What would be the ideal (or best practice) architecture for such a thing? Where would I deligate permissions? On the document itself? Would I have another model handling permissions? How would I create the complex rule-based system where access is granted based on a specific email, a broader domain affiliation, and an even broader site-wide roles.
I can imagine a situation where each document has field for different permissions. For instance:
owner: my id
admin: all the site's admins
moderator: all the site's moderators
viewers: a list of emails / domains
editors: a list of emails / domains
But, is this scalable?
I'd love to get some advice.
Thanks!
I have checked the docs from Microsoft for AzureDevops and I understand how to manage permissions for a branch.
What I would like to know is if a user is automatically added with Edit Policies permission to Allow as he creates the branch (assuming a normal user not admin, and he's not inheriting this permission) ?
If the answer to the above question is yes, then is there any case when a second user could be added to the list of branch permissions automatically ? without an administrator adding it explicitly ? I couldn't find this in the docs anywhere.
*picture from msdn
Yes, for each branch's permission setting, you could directly manage that user's or create a group then add that consultancy in the group, manage the group's permission.
In other words, without adding it explicitly, the user B could also be added to a group.
You just need to make sure that you are not part of any groups that have the complete privilege Denied.
In Azure DevOps, Deny trumps Allow.
Unless you're a member of the Project Collection Administrators group on your organization, membership in a group that explicitly Denies any permission will deny your permission, even if you are in another group that explicitly Allows you the permission and even if you as an individual user are granted Allow on that permission.
We usually add developer to Contributors.
For the Inheritance part, you could turn on your inheritance and clear explicit with single click for each branch which have explicit permissions.
After this, Contributors Group in other branches will totally inherit the permissions set by root path of your repo/workspace. For example, if root path are Allow, your branches should be Allow(inherited), if it's Deny, your branches should be Deny(inherited).
If a permission isn't directly allowed or denied for a user, then it may be inherited in two ways.
Users inherit permissions from the groups to which they belong. When
a permission is allowed for a user directly or through membership in
a group that has that permission, and it is denied, either directly
or through group membership, the permission is denied.
Members of Project Collection Administrators or **Team Foundation
Administrators** retain any allowed permissions, even if they belong to
other groups that deny those permissions.
Object-level permissions that are assigned for nodes of a hierarchy -
areas, iterations, version control folders, work item query folders -
are inherited down the hierarchy. That is, a user's permissions that
are set at area-1 are inherited by area-1/sub-area-1, if the same
permission is not explicitly allowed or denied for area-1/sub-area-1.
If a permission is set explicitly for an object, like
area-1/sub-area-1, then the parent node is not inherited, regardless
of whether it is denied or allowed. If it's not set, then the
permissions for that node are inherited from the closest ancestor
that has the permission explicitly set.
More details please take a look at our official tutorial here: Inheritance and security groups
We saw PostgreSQL roles in class this year. Our teacher told us that it is more secure to use different roles with custom rights for every table or even column if necessary.
We have a project in which we have to use PostgreSQL to build a website with restricted access for connected users, who can be of different types (admin, employee, client). To follow the teacher's recommendations, we created different roles with different rights (one for each type of user).
We decided to use Go for our back end (with token auth) but I can't figure it out how to use our roles, which are more groups than users. I read in the doc that you "open" the connection to the DB once for all but to do so you have to give a PostgreSQL role. I didn't find a way to change the connected role without closing and reopening the DB. If I run the application without changing connected roles, how can PostgreSQL control if a user has the right to access tables he needs for the requests.
You can change roles on the fly in PostgreSQL. If you are logged in as nobody, and nobody is a member of role cleve, you can become role admins with
SET ROLE cleve;
But using that during authentication is problematic, because there is nothing that keeps the user from running the statement
RESET ROLE;
to become nobody again and then impersonating somebody else.
Typically, there are two ways how you can use the role system to leverage database permissions:
You have a personalized database user for every user of the application.
That is of course only feasible if the set of users is fairly constant and limited.
Then the individual users have no permissions at all, and there are certain roles like admin, reader, accountant and so on. The login roles are assigned permissions by becoming members of one or more of these roles, and they inherit their permissions.
You don't have personalized database users.
Then you only have one login role per set of permissions, say accountant, admin, viewer and so on.
The application has to decide as which user it should connect before establishing the database connection. If you need database queries for this decision, you perform those as a nobody database user with very limited permissions. For example, it may call a function that verifies a user-supplied password.
You can use the set role command to change the role while the session is open.
I am planning to write a Role Base Access Control Mechanism. What I thought is to have a set of permissions, which can be associated with each role. Normally Membership provider comes with normal roles and its details not with Permission sets. Roles with permission can be assigned to the new users. Permission Sets to Roles will give more flexibility compared to normal roles. Can any help me to do this ?
Thanks in Advance.
Best Regards,
Rajesh
You could implement your own authorization attribute, where instead of just checking which roles the user belongs to, you could check the permission sets that you have associated with the role(s) (or user).
I think this article is a good starting point.