If a SSL SMTP server requires a STARTTLS command to be used (java mail property: mail.smtp.starttls.required), do we also need to enable Plaintext Authentication over TLS?
I'm not sure exactly what you mean by "plaintext authentication over TLS".
If the server requires STARTTLS, a plain text (non-SSL) connection is made to the server, TLS (SSL) is started on the connection, and then authentication is done. Authentication can use any authentication mechanisms supported by both client and server, including the PLAIN authentication mechanism.
Related
From my browser I want to communicate to localhost application using ssl. Here browser(which acts as client) will submit the certificate instead of localhost application(which acts as server). Can Ssl be established in this scenario? So finally it boils down to problem statement can a ssl communication be established by server validating the client certificate and client not validating the server certificate.
The SSL/TLS implementation inside the browser do not support this scenario. A server certificate is always required by the browser with SSL/TLS in order to be sure that the browser is communicating with the expected server (as specified in the URL) and not some man in the middle. Apart from that it is not clear what you want to achieve with such a setup in the first place - maybe there is a better design for your unknown use case.
i use npgsql version 2270 and i would to secure my connection passing db password NOT in cleartext and with capability to use SSL connection on a preconfigured postgresql server. My doubt is about how set the connection string with npgsql.
I tryed adding ssl=true sslmode=prefer to conn string but i have not idea about how to verify if it work.
Is sufficient for secure data transit? is string correct?
Is needed to activate ssl also on server is right?
How can i verify if data transit on ssl mode ? Thanks all.
First, SSL isn't really about encrypting your password - it's about encrypting the entire stream. If you use PostgreSQL's md5 authentication method (see your pg_hba.conf), then passwords are never transferred in cleartext regardless of whether you're using SSL or not.
To use SSL, it's better to set SSL Mode to require rather than prefer: the latter will attempt to establish an SSL connection, but will fallback to non-SSL if the server doesn't support it. require will fail the connection attempt if SSL could not be established.
Regardless, yes, you need to set up SSL on PostgreSQL, including a certificate and a private key - you can read about this in the documentation.
If the aim is only to avoid sending passwords in cleartext, using md5 (or sha256 in more recent versions) is the simplest way.
On Windows 7Pro, I have a secure socket client app using schannel.
Connecting to a secure server with TLSV1.0, 1.1 and 1.2, without client authentication works fine.
Connecting to a secure server with TLSV1.0, 1.1, with client authentication works fine.
A connection with client authentication with TLSV1.2 fails. Instead of replying with handshake certificate, the client replies with 3 TLS records: Client Key exchange-Cipher change spec-Client key exchange. As the server does not receive the client's certificate, it aborts the connection.
The client's certificate has an intermediate and trusted root ca. In all cases AcquireCredentialsHandle is called with
SCH_CRED_NO_DEFAULT_CREDS|SCH_CRED_MANUAL_CRED_VALIDATION|SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK,
and InitializeSecurityContext with (among others)
ISC_REQ_MANUAL_CRED_VALIDATION and ISC_REQ_USE_SUPPLIED_CREDS.
Do I need to treat client authentication differently for TLS V1.2?
Currently I am using Net::LDAP::Server to setup my server but it is not secure enough.
Is there any module or method so that I can setup a LDAP server over TLS or other secure connection?
I just found many information about how to connect to a secure ldap server, but cant found how to setup a secure ldap server.
Can anyone give some advices?
How does an LDAPS connection work
LDAPS is an unofficial protocol. It is to LDAP what HTTPS is to HTTP, namely the exact same protocol (but in this case LDAPv2 or LDAPv3) running over a secured SSL ("Secure Socket Layer") connection to port 636 (by default).
Not all servers will be configured to listen for LDAPS connections, but if they do, it will commonly be on a different port from the normal plain text LDAP port.
Using LDAPS can potentially solve the vulnerabilities described above, but you should be aware that simply "using" SSL is not a magic bullet that automatically makes your system "secure".
First of all, LDAPS can solve the problem of verifying that you are connected to the correct server. When the client and server connect, they perform a special SSL 'handshake', part of which involves the server and client exchanging cryptographic keys, which are described using X.509 certificates. If the client wishes to confirm that it is connected to the correct server, all it needs to do is verify the server's certificate which is sent in the handshake. This is done in two ways:
check that the certificate is signed (trusted) by someone that you trust, and that the certificate hasn't been revoked. For instance, the server's certificate may have been signed by Verisign (www.verisign.com), and you decide that you want to trust Verisign to sign legitimate certificates.
check that the least-significant cn RDN in the server's certificate's DN is the fully-qualified hostname of the hostname that you connected to when creating the LDAPS object. For example if the server is , then the RDN to check is cn=ldap.example.com.
You can do this by using the cafile and capath options when creating a Net::LDAPS object, and by setting the verify option to 'require'.
To prevent hackers 'sniffing' passwords and other information on your connection, you also have to make sure the encryption algorithm used by the SSL connection is good enough. This is also something that gets decided by the SSL handshake - if the client and server cannot agree on an acceptable algorithm the connection is not made.
Net::LDAPS will by default use all the algorithms built into your copy of OpenSSL, except for ones considered to use "low" strength encryption, and those using export strength encryption. You can override this when you create the Net::LDAPS object using the 'ciphers' option.
Once you've made the secure connection, you should also check that the encryption algorithm that is actually being used is one that you find acceptable. Broken servers have been observed in the field which 'fail over' and give you an unencrypted connection, so you ought to check for that.
How does LDAP and TLS work
SSL is a good solution to many network security problems, but it is not a standard. The IETF corrected some defects in the SSL mechanism and published a standard called RFC 2246 which describes TLS ("Transport Layer Security"), which is simply a cleaned up and standardized version of SSL.
You can only use TLS with an LDAPv3 server. That is because the standard (RFC 2830) for LDAP and TLS requires that the normal LDAP connection (ie., on port 389) can be switched on demand from plain text into a TLS connection. The switching mechanism uses a special extended LDAP operation, and since these are not legal in LDAPv2, you can only switch to TLS on an LDAPv3 connection.
So the way you use TLS with LDAPv3 is that you create your normal LDAPv3 connection using Net::LDAP::new(), and then you perform the switch using Net::LDAP::start_tls(). The start_tls() method takes pretty much the same arguments as Net::LDAPS::new(), so check above for details.
Well, perhaps LDAPS is not an RFC but to say it is not a standard or secure is certainly a stretch.
LDAPS is supported by ALL LDAP Server Vendors.
LDAPS is at least as secure as HTTPS.
As with ALL SSL (or TLS) the security weak points are how the certificates are handled.
Certainly LDAPS is more supported by LDAP server vendors and clients than is TLS. Active Directory as one example, does not support TLS. Querying the rootDSE for the supportedExtention 1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.20037 will (should) show if TLS is supported on any particular LDAP server.
We have some examples at:
http://ldapwiki.willeke.com/wiki/Perl%20LDAP%20Samples.
I'm trying to connect to gmail using a simple java program (like this one). But my question is:
Is there a way to do this with encrypted password and not the real password, for security reasons of course!! something like how we do in java-Oracle db ?
By default, the only authentication mechanism for IMAP is the LOGIN command, which takes an unencrypted username and password. You can add an encryption layer on top of it, either by connecting via IMAPs or starting a TLS layer via the STARTTLS command, but it still requires the client to know the cleartext password.
A server can optionally also provide SASL authentication methods invokable via the AUTHENTICATE command. The server advertises which SASL mechanisms it supports in its response to the CAPABILITY command. For instance, if the server includes the capability "AUTH=PLAIN", the client can use the PLAIN SASL authentication method via the AUTHENTICATE PLAIN IMAP command.
Gmail supports only one SASL authentication mechanism, XOAUTH:
C: 1 capability
S: * CAPABILITY IMAP4rev1 UNSELECT IDLE NAMESPACE QUOTA XLIST CHILDREN XYZZY
SASL-IR AUTH=XOAUTH
S: 1 OK Thats all she wrote! dv32if2169247ibb.17
XOAUTH is a nonstandard SASL authentication mechanism using OAuth. (The leading 'X' means it's not standardized.) Google has published a document defining the XOAUTH SASL mechanism. They've also provided a google-mail-xoauth-tools package, which includes sample code showing how to use JavaMail with Gmail via XOAUTH.