When using Desfire native wrapped APDUs to communicate with the card, which parts of the command and response must be used to calculate CMAC?
After successful authentication, I have the following session key:
Session Key: 7CCEBF73356F21C9191E87472F9D0EA2
Then when I send a GetKeyVersion command, card returns the following CMAC which I'm trying to verify:
<< 90 64 00 00 01 00 00
>> 00 3376289145DA8C27 9100
I have implemented CMAC algorithm according to "NIST special publication 800-38B" and made sure it is correct. But I don't know which parts of command and response APDUs must be used to calculate CMAC.
I am using TDES, so MAC is 8 bytes.
I have been looking at the exact same issue for the last few days and I think I can at least give you some pointers. Getting everything 'just so' has taken some time and the documentation from NXP (assuming you have access) is a little difficult to interpret in some cases.
So, as you probably know, you need to calculate the CMAC (and update your init vec) on transmit as well as receive. You need to save the CMAC each time you calculate it as the init vec for the next crypto operation (whether CMAC or encryption etc).
When calculating the CMAC for your example the data to feed into your CMAC algorithm is the INS byte (0x64) and the command data (0x00). Of course this will be padded etc as specified by CMAC. Note, however, that you do not calculate the CMAC across the entire APDU wrapping (i.e. 90 64 00 00 01 00 00) just the INS byte and data payload is used.
On receive you need to take the data (0x00) and the second status byte (also 0x00) and calculate the CMAC over that. It's not important in this example but order is important here. You use the response body (excluding the CMAC) then SW2.
Note that only half of the CMAC is actually sent - CMAC should yield 16 bytes and the card is sending the first 8 bytes.
There were a few other things that held me up including:
I was calculating the session key incorrectly - it is worth double checking this if things are not coming out as you'd expect
I interpreted the documentation to say that the entire APDU structure is used to calculate the CMAC (hard to read them any other way tbh)
I am still working on calculating the response from a Write Data command correctly. The command succeeds but I can't validate the CMAC. I do know that Write Data is not padded with CMAC padding but just zeros - not yet sure what else I've missed.
Finally, here is a real example from communicating with a card from my logs:
Authentication is complete (AES) and the session key is determined to be F92E48F9A6C34722A90EA29CFA0C3D12; init vec is zeros
I'm going to send the Get Key Version command (as in your example) so I calculate CMAC over 6400 and get 1200551CA7E2F49514A1324B7E3428F1 (which is now my init vec for the next calculation)
Send 90640000010000 to the card and receive 00C929939C467434A8 (status is 9100).
Calculate CMAC over 00 00 and get C929939C467434A8A29AB2C40B977B83 (and update init vec for next calculation)
The first half of our CMAC from step #4 matches the 8 byte received from the card in step #3
Sry for my English,- its terrible :) but it's not my native language. I'm Russian.
Check first MSB (7 - bit) of array[0] and then shiffting this to the left. And then XOR if MSB 7 bit was == 1;
Or save first MSB bit of array[0] and after shiffting put this bit at the end of array[15] at the end (LSB bit).
Just proof it's here:
https://www.nxp.com/docs/en/application-note/AN10922.pdf
Try this way:
Zeros <- 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
SessionKey <- 00 01 02 03 E3 27 64 0C 0C 0D 0E 0F 5C 5D B9 D5
Data <- 6F 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
First u have to encrypt 16 bytes (zeros) with SesionKey;
enc_aes_128_ecb(Zeros);
And u get EncryptedData.
EncryptedData <- 3D 08 A2 49 D9 71 58 EA 75 73 18 F2 FA 6A 27 AC
Check bit 7 [MSB - LSB] of EncryptedData[0] == 1? switch i to true;
bool i = false;
if (EncryptedData[0] & 0x80){
i = true;
}
Then do Shiffting of all EncryptedData to 1 bit <<.
ShiftLeft(EncryptedData,16);
And now, when i == true - XOR the last byte [15] with 0x87
if (i){
ShiftedEncryptedData[15] ^= 0x87;
}
7A 11 44 93 B2 E2 B1 D4 EA E6 31 E5 F4 D4 4F 58
Save it as KEY_1.
Try bit 7 [MSB - LSB] of ShiftedEncryptedData[0] == 1?
i = false;
if (ShiftedEncryptedData[0] & 0x80){
i = true;
}
Then do Shiffting of all ShiftedEncryptedData to 1 bit <<.
ShiftLeft(ShiftedEncryptedData,16);
And now, when i == true - XOR the last byte [15] with 0x87
if (i){
ShiftedEncryptedData[15] ^= 0x87;
}
F4 22 89 27 65 C5 63 A9 D5 CC 63 CB E9 A8 9E B0
Save it as KEY_2.
Now we take our Data (6F 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00)
As Michael say's - pad command with 0x80 0x00...
XOR Data with KEY_2 - if command was padded, or KEY_1 if don't.
If we have more like 16 bytes (32 for example) u have to XOR just last 16 bytes.
Then encrypt it:
enc_aes_128_ecb(Data);
Now u have a CMAC.
CD C0 52 62 6D F6 60 CA 9B C1 09 FF EF 64 1A E3
Zeros <- 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
SessionKey <- 00 01 02 03 E3 27 64 0C 0C 0D 0E 0F 5C 5D B9 D5
Key_1 <- 7A 11 44 93 B2 E2 B1 D4 EA E6 31 E5 F4 D4 4F 58
Key_2 <- F4 22 89 27 65 C5 63 A9 D5 CC 63 CB E9 A8 9E B0
Data <- 6F 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
CMAC <- CD C0 52 62 6D F6 60 CA 9B C1 09 FF EF 64 1A E3
C/C++ function:
void ShiftLeft(byte *data, byte dataLen){
for (int n = 0; n < dataLen - 1; n++) {
data[n] = ((data[n] << 1) | ((data[n+1] >> 7)&0x01));
}
data[dataLen - 1] <<= 1;
}
Have a nice day :)
Related
I need some help to understand the avcC atom structure of a particular mp4 sample I am trying to analyze.
Hex dump:
00 00 00 38 61 76 63 43 01 64 00 1F FF E1 00 1C 67 64 00 1F AC D9 80
50 05 BB 01 6A 02 02 02 80 00 00 03 00 80 00 00 1E 07 8C 18 CD 01 00
05 68 E9 7B 2C 8B FD F8 F8 00 00 00 00 13 63 6F 6C 72
This is what I understand from the above:
00 00 00 38 Size of avcC atom
61 76 63 43 avcC signature
01 configurationVersion
64 AVCProfileIndication
00 profile_compatibility
1F AVCLevelIndication
FF 111111b + lengthSizeMinusOne
E1 111b + numOfSequenceParameterSets (in this case, 1 SPS)
00 1C SPS length (in this case, 28 bytes)
67 64 00 1F AC D9 80 50 05 BB 01 6A 02 02 02 80 00 00 03 00 80 00 00 1E 07 8C 18 CD SPS data (28 bytes as per above)
01 numOfPictureParameterSets (in this case, 1 PPS)
00 05 PPS length
This is where the problem begins. Based on the PPS length given by the previous bytes, the next 5 bytes should be the PPS data: 68 E9 7B 2C 8B
However according to the avcC header, the total length of the atom is 56 bytes (0x38), which means that the following 4 bytes should be included: FD F8 F8 00
But the problem is that the PPS length is given as 5 bytes (0x05). So what exactly are these final 4 bytes?
Then follows the header of the colr atom:
00 00 00 13 size of colr atom
63 6F 6C 72 colr signature
Which I have checked and is indeed 19 bytes in length (0x13).
The problem is with the avcC atom and with that particular mp4 sample I am analyzing (I've checked other samples too and they didn't have this peculiarity).
You can find the sample here.
EDIT
mp4info tool from the bento4 suite reports the following as the avcC atom's size: 8+48
And mp4dump reports:
AVC SPS: [6764001facd9805005bb016a02020280000003008000001e078c18cd]
AVC PPS: [68e97b2c8b]
So it correctly reports the total size of the atom as 56 bytes (0x38) based on what is found in the avcC header, but the SPS/PPS data are analyzed the same way as above. I still don't understand what the final 4 bytes are or where do they belong.
I dind't get any answer but fortunately a bit more careful reading of ISO 14496-15 solved this issue:
if( profile_idc == 100 || profile_idc == 110 ||
profile_idc == 122 || profile_idc == 144 )
{
bit(6) reserved = ‘111111’b;
unsigned int(2) chroma_format;
bit(5) reserved = ‘11111’b;
unsigned int(3) bit_depth_luma_minus8;
bit(5) reserved = ‘11111’b;
unsigned int(3) bit_depth_chroma_minus8;
unsigned int(8) numOfSequenceParameterSetExt;
for (i=0; i< numOfSequenceParameterSetExt; i++) {
unsigned int(16) sequenceParameterSetExtLength;
bit(8*sequenceParameterSetExtLength) sequenceParameterSetExtNALUnit;
}
}
Apparently a sequence of 4+ bytes may exist at the end of an avcC atom depending on the profile used. In my sample above the profile is 100 (0x64), hence it meets the criteria. So the last 4 bytes are:
FD = bits 111111 are reserved, remaining 01 means chroma subsampling 4:2:0
F8 = bits 11111 are reserved, remaining 000 means luma bit depth is 8
F8 = bits 11111 are reserved, remaining 000 means chroma bit depth is 8
00 = zero SPS extensions
I like to modify config files directly (like .gitignore and .git/config) instead of remembering arbitrary commands, but I don't know where Git stores the file references that get passed to "git update-index --assume-unchanged file".
If you know, please do tell!
It says where in the command - git update-index
So you can't really be editing the index as it is not a text file.
Also, to give more detail on what is stored with the git update-index --assume-unchanged command, see the Using “assume unchanged” bit section in the manual
As others said, it's stored in the index, which is located at .git/index.
After some detective work, I found that it is located at the: assume valid bit of each index entry.
Therefore, before understanding what follows, you should first understand the global format of the index, as explained in my other answer.
Next, I will explain how I verified that the "assume valid" bit is the culprit:
empirically
by reading the source
Empirical
Time to hd it up.
Setup:
git init
echo a > b
git add b
Then:
hd .git/index
Gives:
00000000 44 49 52 43 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 01 54 e9 b6 f3 |DIRC........T...|
00000010 2d 4f e1 2f 54 e9 b6 f3 2d 4f e1 2f 00 00 08 05 |-O./T...-O./....|
00000020 00 de 32 ff 00 00 81 a4 00 00 03 e8 00 00 03 e8 |..2.............|
00000030 00 00 00 00 e6 9d e2 9b b2 d1 d6 43 4b 8b 29 ae |...........CK.).|
00000040 77 5a d8 c2 e4 8c 53 91 00 01 62 00 c9 a2 4b c1 |wZ....S...b...K.|
00000050 23 00 1e 32 53 3c 51 5d d5 cb 1a b4 43 18 ad 8c |#..2S<Q]....C...|
00000060
Now:
git update-index --assume-unchanged b
hd .git/index
Gives:
00000000 44 49 52 43 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 01 54 e9 b6 f3 |DIRC........T...|
00000010 2d 4f e1 2f 54 e9 b6 f3 2d 4f e1 2f 00 00 08 05 |-O./T...-O./....|
00000020 00 de 32 ff 00 00 81 a4 00 00 03 e8 00 00 03 e8 |..2.............|
00000030 00 00 00 00 e6 9d e2 9b b2 d1 d6 43 4b 8b 29 ae |...........CK.).|
00000040 77 5a d8 c2 e4 8c 53 91 80 01 62 00 17 08 a8 58 |wZ....S...b....X|
00000050 f7 c5 b3 e1 7d 47 ac a2 88 d9 66 c7 5c 2f 74 d7 |....}G....f.\/t.|
00000060
By comparing the two indexes, and looking at the global structure of the index, see that the only differences are:
byte number 0x48 (9th on line 40) changed from 00 to 80. That is our flag, the first bit of the cache entry flags.
the 20 bytes from 0x4C to 0x5F. This is expected since that is a SHA-1 over the entire index.
This has also though me that the SHA-1 of the index entry in bytes from 0x34 to 0x47 does not take into account the flags, since it did not changed between both indexes. This is probably why the flags are placed after the SHA, which only considers what comes before it.
Source code
Now let's see if that is coherent with source code of Git 2.3.
First look at the source of update-index, grep assume-unchanged.
This leads to the following line:
{OPTION_SET_INT, 0, "assume-unchanged", &mark_valid_only, NULL,
N_("mark files as \"not changing\""),
PARSE_OPT_NOARG | PARSE_OPT_NONEG, NULL, MARK_FLAG},
{OPTION_SET_INT, 0, "no-assume-unchanged", &mark_valid_only, NULL,
N_("clear assumed-unchanged bit"),
PARSE_OPT_NOARG | PARSE_OPT_NONEG, NULL, UNMARK_FLAG},
so the value is stored at mark_valid_only. Grep it, and find that it is only used at one place:
if (mark_valid_only) {
if (mark_ce_flags(path, CE_VALID, mark_valid_only == MARK_FLAG))
die("Unable to mark file %s", path);
return;
}
CE means Cache Entry.
By quickly inspecting mark_ce_flags, we see that:
if (mark)
active_cache[pos]->ce_flags |= flag;
else
active_cache[pos]->ce_flags &= ~flag;
So the function basically sets or unsets the CE_VALID bit, depending on mark_valid_only, which is a tri-state:
mark: --assume-unchanged
unmark: --no-assume-unchanged
do nothing: the default value 0 of the option set at {OPTION_SET_INT, 0
Next, by grepping under builtin/, we see that no other place sets the value of CE_VALID, so --assume-unchanged must be the only command that sets it.
The flag is however used in many places of the source code, which should be expected as it has many side-effects, and it is used every time like:
ce->ce_flags & CE_VALID
so we conclude that it is part of the ce_flags field of struct cache_entry.
The index is specified at cache.h because one of its functions is to be a cache for creating commits faster.
By looking at the definition of CE_VALID under cache.h and surrounding lines we have:
#define CE_STAGEMASK (0x3000)
#define CE_EXTENDED (0x4000)
#define CE_VALID (0x8000)
#define CE_STAGESHIFT 12
So we conclude that it is the very first bit of that integer (0x8000), just next to the CE_EXTENDED, which is coherent with my earlier experiment.
I'm currently working with NFC/NDEF and I'm running into an issue where I'm unable to understand the data coming in. I have a general understanding of the NDEF standard and have looked over the MIFARE datasheet, so I'm able to pick out a few things, but there are a few bytes that are seemingly out of place and are puzzling me.
Here is the hexdump of the data on the tag, collected via nfc-mfultralight r:
00000000 04 02 2f a1 d2 11 5f 81 1d 48 00 00 e1 10 12 00 |../..._..H......|
00000010 01 03 a0 0c 34 03 1b 91 01 05 54 02 65 6e 68 69 |....4.....T.enhi|
00000020 11 01 05 54 02 65 6e 68 69 51 01 05 54 02 65 6e |...T.enhiQ..T.en|
00000030 68 69 fe 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |hi..............|
I know the first 16 bytes (04 02 2f a1 d2 11 5f 81 1d 48 00 00 e1 10 12 00) are the NFC/MIFARE header (first 9 being the serial number/check bytes, 1 byte for internal, 2 for lock, and then final 4 are OTP bytes.)
Starting at byte 21 I can see the start of a TLV record with the Terminator TLV flag at the end (03 1b ... fe), indicating a record of NDEF type with length 27. This matches the length of the expected NDEF record.
However, I'm confused by bytes 16..20 (01 03 a0 0c 34). What are these?
It appears these are a part of the Lock Control TLV, a part of the NFC Type 2 Tag standard (pages 10-11).
The bytes are laid out as such:
0x01 - Lock Control TLV block name
0x03 - Length is 3 bytes
0xa0 - Encodes the position within the tag the lock area is at, composed of two nibbles:
0b0000 - Higher 4 bits represent the number of pages, while the lower 4 bits are the number of bytes
0b1100 - The number of bits used in the lock area.
0x0c - Indicates size in bits of the lock area
0x34 - Provides number of bytes in a page and the number of bytes each dynamic lock bit is able to lock.
Hi I have scraped a large number of midi files off the internet.
I am using them for training material to train a generative adversarial network. I find that many midi files conform to the midi standard but then I run into issues with midi meta events with values of FF11 and FF10 . I have looked up the midi specification from several sources and have never found midi meta events defined in this way. Here is the hex of a midi track event with some of the offending values:
4D 54 72 6B 00 00 1A 8D 00 FF 03 0D 47 75 69 74
61 72 20 44 41 44 47 41 44 00 FF 10 08 00 00 3E
39 37 32 2D 26 00 C0 19 00 C1 19 00 B0 65 00 00
B0 64 00 00 B0 06 02 00 B0 65 7F 00 B0 64 7F 00
E0 00 40 00 B1 65 00 00 B1 64 00 00 B1 06 02 00
B1 65 7F 00 B1 64 7F 00 E1 00 40 00 B0 0A 3F 00
B1 0A 3F 00 B0 5D 10 00 B0 5B 1E 00 B1 5D 10 00
B1 5B 1E 81 69 FF 11 01 00 00 90 3E 51 08 FF 11
I cant seem to find any information whatsoever on these values even though these midi files play over timidity and other midi player software perfectly. Can anyone point me to some information about them and what they mean? any help would be greatly , greatly appreciated. :-) resolving this issue would be a service to the miriad of people who are trying to use the python-midi library to train tensorflow models and this I am sure is only a fraction of the people who would be effected.
The SMF specification says:
As with chunks, future meta-events may be designed which may not be known to existing programs, so programs must properly ignore meta-events which they do not recognize, and indeed, should expect to see them.
I am not aware of any published extension that defines values 10h or 11h; it's likely that some sequencer uses these for its own purposes, and violated the specification by not using type 7F for that.
I have SCL011 Card Reader and need to read/write Mifare 1k cards. But I just can't get over Authentification step....
Card Reader should handle Mifare 1k cards:
Antenna ISO/IEC 14443 compliant design
Baudrate up to 848 Kbps
Supported standards:
ISO/IEC 14443-4 Typ A & B
MIFARE: Classic 1K and 4K, DESFire, Ultralight, MIFARE Plus
FeliCa™
NFC forum tag type 1, 2, 3, 4
iCLASS UID*
I have also updated to the latest firmware (1.20)
http://support.identive-group.com/dfu_fw.php?OS=windows&readerno=85
card is connected and I can read the UID of the card with ff ca 00 00 00
I have also tried to read the sector directly without authorization ff b0 00 00 10 and I get message:
69 82 : Command not allowed. Security status not satisfied.
it means I need authorize myself, but if I try ff 82 00 00 06 ff ff ff ff ff ff or any other standard keys I always get back:
69 88 : Command not allowed. SM data objects incorrect.
funny thing is, that I can read and write this card without problems with my Nexus and Lumia phones...
What I'm doing wrong? Thanks for any help!
keys I have already tried:
* ff 82 00 00 06 ff ff ff ff ff ff
* ff 82 00 00 06 a0 b0 c0 d0 e0 f0
* ff 82 00 00 06 a1 b1 c1 d1 e1 f1
* ff 82 00 00 06 a0 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5
* ff 82 00 00 06 b0 b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
* ff 82 00 00 06 4d 3a 99 c3 51 dd
* ff 82 00 00 06 1a 98 2c 7e 45 9a
* ff 82 00 00 06 00 00 00 00 00 00
* ff 82 00 00 06 d3 f7 d3 f7 d3 f7
* ff 82 00 00 06 aa bb cc dd ee ff
Solution: Please google/search "Multiprotocol contactless mobile reader, Reference manual" or "SCL01X Multiprotocol contactless stationary reader".
It is a very nice references to start with SCL reader's APDUs. There are some examples inside.
Answer: In your case P2 value in the APDU Command incorrect and you got SW1SW2 = 0x6988 - "Key number not valid".
Where P2 can have the following values (please refer to MIFARE documentation from NXP for
further details on what is key A and Key B):
• 0x60 to use the Key A
• 0x61 to use the Key B