When you create a new namespace in Kubernetes there always will be a default-token secret available in it.
$ kubectl create namespace test
$ kubectl get secrets -n test
NAME TYPE DATA AGE
default-token-wh7hv kubernetes.io/service-account-token 3 6m10s
Question:
How can I create a secret that will be always available (as in above example) in newly created namespace?
default-token is used within the cluster and managed by the cluster.
ServiceAccounts are intended to provide an identity for a Kubernetes Pod to be used by its container to authenticate and authorize them when performing API-requests to the Kubernetes API-server. Default ServiceAccount will be created when you create namespace.
Secret resources reside in a namespace. Secrets can only be referenced by Pods in that same namespace.
If you want a way to create your own secret when additional ns created for that you will need an extra utility.
You can write a code to communicate with K8s API
Check the namespace list periodically.
Create a secret when an additional namespace created.
Related
Is it possible to create a Kubernetes service and pod in different namespaces, for example, having myweb-svc pointing to the actual running myweb-pod, while myweb-svc and myweb-pod are in different namespaces?
YAML manifest to create both the pod and the service in their respective namespaces. You need to specify the ‘namespace’ field in the ‘metadata’ section of both the ‘pod’ and ‘service’ objects to specify the namespace in which they should be created.
Also, if you want to point your Service to a Service in a different namespace or on another cluster you can use service without a pod selector.
Refer to this link on Understanding kubernetes Object for more information.
Kubernetes API objects that are connected together at the API layer generally need to be in the same namespace. So a Service can only connect to Pods in its own namespace; if a Pod references a ConfigMap or a Secret or a PersistentVolumeClaim, those need to be in the same namespace as well.
Manifest(yml) with kubernetes resource type(kind: Namespace) can be applied through kubectl to create a virtual cluster
In our environment, manifest yaml's are applied using kubectl to create kubernetes resource types(deployment, service, autoscaling, ingress) under the given namespace
But, rancher is used to create kubernetes resource type(kind: Namespace virtual cluster).
What is the advantage of creating kubernetes resource type(Namespace) using rancher? instead of a manifest yaml applied through kubectl
Rancher uses concept of "Project" which is not present in "vanilla" kubernetes, which allows you to assign RBAC roles, PodSecurityPolicy etc to a group of namespaces in easy way.
If you are not using rancher to create projects and namespaces - you have to assign all these Roles and PSPs by yourself. For example, if you have default restricted policy on your cluster, namespace created by kubectl create namespace foo won't be able to run any pods by default, see https://rancher.com/docs/rancher/v2.5/en/admin-settings/pod-security-policies/
Namespaces that are not assigned to projects do not inherit PSPs, regardless of whether the PSP is assigned to a cluster or project. Because these namespaces have no PSPs, workload deployments to these namespaces will fail, which is the default Kubernetes behavior.
To sum it up, namespaces can be created using kubectl create namespace or manifests, but it might be cumbersome to make it all work well. Using rancher to provision namespaces is easier to maintain and troubleshoot.
As for advantages, having ability to group namespaces under "project" and assign resources, PSP and roles to a group of namespaces with rancher UI support is one of the main selling points of having rancher in a first place. Namespace objects themselves are basically the same as anywhere else.
I am trying to create a K8s cluster in Azure AKS and when cluster is ready I can see couple of resources are created within the default namespace. Example secret, configmap:
As a security recommendation NO k8s resources should be created under the default namespace so how to avoid it? It's created by default during cluster creation.
I have found the same question asked here:
User srbose-msft (Microsoft employee) explained the principle of operation very well:
In Kubernetes, a ServiceAccount controller manages the ServiceAccounts inside namespaces, and ensures a ServiceAccount named "default" exists in every active namespace. [Reference]
TokenController runs as part of kube-controller-manager. It acts asynchronously. It watches ServiceAccount creation and creates a corresponding ServiceAccount token Secret to allow API access. [Reference] Thus, the secret for the default ServiceAccount token is also created.
Trusting the custom CA from an application running as a pod usually requires some extra application configuration. You will need to add the CA certificate bundle to the list of CA certificates that the TLS client or server trusts. For example, you would do this with a golang TLS config by parsing the certificate chain and adding the parsed certificates to the RootCAs field in the tls.Config struct.
You can distribute the CA certificate as a ConfigMap that your pods have access to use. [Reference] AKS implements this in all active namespaces through ConfigMaps named kube-root-ca.crt in these namespaces.
You shall also find a Service named kubernetes in the default namespace. It has a ServiceType of ClusterIP and exposes the API Server Endpoint also named kubernetes internally to the cluster in the default namespace.
All the resources mentioned above will be created by design at the time of cluster creation and their creation cannot be prevented. If you try to remove these resources manually, they will be recreated to ensure desired goal state by the kube-controller-manager.
Additionally:
The Kubernetes clusters should not use the default namespace Policy is still in Preview. Currently the schema does not explicitly allow for Kubernetes resources in the default namespace to be excluded during policy evaluation. However, at the time of writing, the schema allows for labelSelector.matchExpressions[].operator which can be set to NotIn with appropriate labelSelector.matchExpressions[].values for the Service default/kubernetes with label:
component=apiserver
The default ServiceAccount, the default ServiceAccount token Secret and the RootCA ConfigMap themselves are not created with any labels and hence cannot to added to this list. If this is impeding your use-case I would urge you to share your feedback at https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/azure/ct-p/Azure
kubectl explain serviceaccount.secrets describes ServiceAccount Secrets as the secrets allowed to be used by Pods running using this ServiceAccount, but what effect does adding a Secret name to this list have?
The ServiceAccount token Secret (which is automatically added to this list) gets automatically mounted as a volume into all containers in a Pod running using this ServiceAccount (as long as the ServiceAccount admission controller is enabled), but what happens for other secrets?
It holds the name of all secrets containing tokens for that SA so when the controller goes to rotate things, it knows where to find them.
We're trying to create different kuberentes secrets and offer access to specific secrets through specific service accounts that are assigned to pods. For example:
Secrets
- User-Service-Secret
- Transaction-Service-Secret
Service Account
- User-Service
- Transaction-Service
Pods
- User-Service-Pod
- Transaction-Service-Pod
The idea is to restrict access to User-Service-Secretsecret to User-Service service account that is assign to User-Service-Pod. So we can set this all up with the relevant kuberentes resources (i.e. ServiceAccount, Role, RoleBinding), but we realize that this may not be actually enforced, because Transaction-Service-Pod can just as easily read the User-Service-Secret secret when Pod starts up, even though the service account its assign to doesn't have get permission to the User-Service-Secret.
How do we actually enforce the RBAC system?
FYI we are using EKS
First it is important to distinguish between API access to the secret and consuming the secret as an environment variable or a mounted volume.
TLDR:
RBAC controls who can access a secret (or any other resource) using K8s API requests.
Namespaces or the service account's secrets attribute control if a pod can consume a secret as an environment variable or through a volume mount.
API access
RBAC is used to control if an identity (in your example the service account) is allowed to access a resource via the K8s API. You control this by creating a RoleBinding (namespaced) or a ClusterRoleBinding (cluster-wide) that binds an identity to a Role (namespaced) or a ClusterRole (not-namespaced) to your identity (service account). Then, when you assign the service account to a pod by setting the serviceAccountName attribute, running kubectl get secret in that pod or the equivalent method from one of the client libraries would mean you have credentials available to make the API request.
Consuming Secrets
This however is independent of configuring the pod to consume the secret as an environment variable or a volume mount. If the container spec in a pod spec references the secret it is made available inside that container. Note, per container, not per pod. You can limit what secret a pod can mount by having the pods in different namespaces, because a pod can only refer to a secret in the same namespace. Additionally, you can use the service account's secrets attribute, to limit what secrets a pod with thet service account can refer to.
$ kubectl explain sa.secrets
KIND: ServiceAccount
VERSION: v1
RESOURCE: secrets <[]Object>
DESCRIPTION:
Secrets is the list of secrets allowed to be used by pods running using
this ServiceAccount. More info:
https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/configuration/secret
ObjectReference contains enough information to let you inspect or modify
the referred object.
You can learn more about the security implications of Kubernetes secrets in the secret documentation.
The idea is to restrict access to User-Service-Secret secret to User-Service service account that is assign to User-Service-Pod. So we can set this all up with the relevant Kubernetes resources (i.e. ServiceAccount, Role, RoleBinding), but we realize that this may not be actually enforced, because Transaction-Service-Pod can just as easily read the User-Service-Secret secret when Pod starts up, even though the service account its assign to doesn't have get permission to the User-Service-Secret.
Yes, this is correct.
This is documented for Kubernetes on privilege escalation via pod creation - within a namespace.
Users who have the ability to create pods in a namespace can potentially escalate their privileges within that namespace. They can create pods that access their privileges within that namespace. They can create pods that access secrets the user cannot themselves read, or that run under a service account with different/greater permissions.
To actually enforce this kind of Security Policies, you probably have to add an extra layer of policies via the admission controller. The Open Policy Agent in the form of OPA Gatekeeper is most likely a good fit for this kind of policy enforcement.