We have multiple types of certificates coming in from different sources. we need to differentiate whether it is a :
eIDAS QWAC
eIDAS QSEALC
Business
any other
if any openssl commands to check this
Related
I am trying to generate a CSR for multiple sites with different top-level domains. These are the domains the client has asked we generate a single CSR for ( is the same for all):
site-name.org
site-name.com
www.site-name.org
www.site-name.com
learn.site-name.org
Is this possible?
I have two use cases: a. Verify Email Address b. Reset forgotten password
For JWT signing, I am just passing a user Id in the payload. Does JWT signing process make sure that two different (unique) JSON tokens be generated for these two use cases? If not, what do I need to do? Kindly help
Thanks
Only when signed using a deterministic algorithm - RS and HS family, all other algorithms (ES, PS, EdDSA) are not deterministic and two tokens with the same header and payload will have different signatures.
I assume that this is possible based on the fact that both utilize RSA for encryption. I should be able to read X.509 and store it as a new OpenPGP key.
The collaborator of my software needs OpenPGP.
Another collaborator provides X.509.
I am looking for a way to convert the keys.
Is that possible, how would one do that?
The short version: you can somewhat, but there is rarely good use in doing so.
You can extract the numbers forming the key and theoretically put together a new X.509 and/or OpenPGP key from them, but those would still remain incompatible, different keys in the respective system. Actually, the monkeysphere project brings tools for both directions (openpgp2pem and pem2openpgp, but make sure to read the rest of the post before heading out and converting keys).
Both X.509 and OpenPGP are more than a file format for keys: they add (incompatible) options for key management and certification, metadata, identifiers, ... Also, both systems use slightly different cryptographic modes of operation, and have very different (and thus incompatible) formats for encrypted and signed messages. They even have enormous differences in how certifications are handled (hierarchical structure in case of X.509 vs. an arbitrary graph in case of OpenPGP).
With other words: anything you do with the X.509 "representation" of an OpenPGP key sharing the same RSA primes cannot be used with the OpenPGP variant, and the other way round. Certificates issued in one system don't work in the other (and cannot be converted!).
As both keys "representations" are incompatible anyway and have to be managed separately, I would strongly recommend to create different sets of keys from beginning. After all, this adds another layer of security in case one of the keys is breached, as the other key stayed undamaged. Apart from performing unusual operations is always error-prone and suspicious to follow-up issues.
There might be good use cases, for example the monkeysphere project requires those conversions for authenticating SSH connection through OpenPGP keys. But I would not consider general usage for signing and encrypting messages and files a good use case for the reasons given above.
Is there a particular order in which the subject attributes - C, ST, L, O, OU, CN have to specified. openssl does not seem to enforce an order.
And while generating the Distinguished Name do we pick up all the subject attributes configured in the certificate? Does the ordering of the attributes matter ?
In theory, it doesn't matter but in practice, some crypto libraries are not able to build a chain if the order of tokens in the subject of parent certificate is different than the order of tokens in issuer field in child certificate. They should be exactly the same if you don't want to have any strange issues.
For example, even the windows 10 tool (mmc) doesn't display correctly the chain if the order of tokens in the subject/issuer field is different.
Is there a particular order in which the subject attributes - C, ST, L, O, OU, CN have to specified.
There is no order specified as far as I know. Order that you specify will be used and in this order will DN be generated in i.e. PKCS#10 request.
And while generating the Distinguished Name do we pick up all the subject attributes configured in the certificate?
CA may (and most probably will) use DN from your PKCS#10 request when issuing certificate but it can decide on a different order. Some RDNs (Relative Distinguished Names) can be moved to extensions, i.e. emailAddress or copied to extensions like CN to SubjectAlternativeName when issuing SSL server certificate.
Does the ordering of the attributes matter ?
Ordering does not IMHO matter. It might matter to some application that is consuming the certificate but in general ordering does not matter.
I am currently working on an architecture, where users can post content any server. To ensure the content has actually been posted by a certain user (and has not been altered after being posted), a signature is created using the private key of the author of the content, whose public key is accessible for everyone on a centralized repository.
Problem is, I have no control over how the content is actually stored on these servers. So I might transmit the content e.g. as a JSON object with all data being base64-encoded and the signature is created using a hash of this the base64-encoded content concatenated in a certain order:
{
"a": "b",
"c": "d",
"signature": "xyz"
}
with
signature := sign(PrivKey, hash(b + d);
Now the server will probably store the content of this in another way, e.g. a database. So maybe the encoding changes. Maybe a mysql_real_escape_string() is done in PHP so stuff gets lost. Now if one wants to check the signature there might be problems.
So usually when creating signatures you have a fixed encoding and a byte sequence (or string) with some kind of unambiguous delimiter - which is not the case here.
Hence the question: How to deal with signatures in this kinda scenario?
It is still required to have a specific message representation in bits or bytes to be able to sign it. There are two ways to do this:
just store the byte representation of the message and don't alter it afterwards (if the message is a string, first encode it with a well defined character encoding);
define a canonical representation of the message, you can either store the canonical representation the message directly or convert it in memory when you are updating the hash within your signature.
A canonical representation of a message is a special, unique representation of the data that somehow distinguishes it from all other possible messages; this may for instance also include sorting the entries of a table (as long as the order doesn't change the meaning of the table), removing whitespace etc.
XML encryption for instance contains canonicalization methods for XML encoding. Obviously it is not possible to define canonicalization for data that has no intrinsic structure. Another (even) more complicated canonical representation is DER for ASN.1 messages (e.g. X509 certificates themselves as well as within RSA signatures).
I think you're really asking two different questions:
How should data be signed?
I suggest using standard digital signature data format when possible, and "detached signatures" at other times. What this means in practice: PDF, Word, Excel and other file formats that provide for digital signatures should remain in those formats.
File formats that don't provide for digital signatures should be signed using a detached signature. The recommended standard for detached signatures is the .p7b file type–A PKCS#7 digital signature structure without the data. Here is an example of signing data with a detached signature from my company.
This means that the "Relying Party" -- the person downloading/receiving the information -- would download two files. The first is the original data file, unchanged. The second file will be the detached signature for the first.
Benefits The signed file formats that directly support digital signatures can have their signatures verified using the file's usual software app. Ie, the free Adobe PDF Reader app knows how to verify digitally signed PDFs. In the same way, MS Word know how to verify signed Word files.
And for the other file types, the associated detached signature file will guarantee to the recipient that the file was not modified since it was signed and who the signer was (depending on the trust issue, see below).
Re database storage -- you don't care how the data is stored on the different servers (database, file system, etc.) In any or all cases, the data should remain unchanged.
How to establish trust between the signer and the recipient
I suggest that the organization create its own root certificate. You can then put the certificate as a file on your SSL web site. (Your web site's SSL certificate should be from a CA, eg Comodo, VeriSign, etc.) The result is that people who trust your web site's SSL certificate can then trust your organizational certificate. And your signers' certificates should be chained to your organization's certificate, thus establishing trust for the recipients.
This method of creating a self-signed organizational certificate is low cost and provides a high level of trust. But relying parties will need to download and install your organization's certificate.
If that is not good, you can get certificates for your signers from a public Certificate Authority (CA), but that will drive up the cost by at least an order of magnitude due to the charges from the CA. My company, CoSign, supports all of these configurations.