When an user account is disabled on a connected IdP, how do I ensure the account is blocked as soon as possible on Keycloak? At the moment, the “disabled” user is able to continue using my SPA because Keycloak continues to refresh the access token without speaking to the external IdP.
One of the critical features required by my partners when using SSO is that they have control over their users’ access to my application. At the moment if the user was logged into my SPA, they can continue using it for about 24 hours. I would hope to cut that time down to 5 minutes, the lifetime of the access token.
The external IdP is Google. I have tried using both Keycloak’s builtin Social provider for Google as well as setting up a SAML app in Google and user-defind SAML provider in Keycloak. I’m using Keycloak v9 but can upgrade if necessary.
Is there a recipe to achieve my goal? What options do I need to set in the Keycloak client and SAML provider?
Many thanks!
The approach could be as follows. The resource server will need to do the checking with the IDP, not Keycloak.
Enable the option to Store Tokens and Read Stored Tokens in the IDP settings.
Assign users the broker/read-tokens role.
On the resource server, decide on a frequency to check whether the user has been disabled on the IDP. Be aware of each IDP's token introspection's endpoint. Each time the API is consumed:
First of course verify the access token as usual.
If it's time to verify against the IDP, call the Keycloak API with the access token to retrieve the IDP's access token.
The Keycloak endpoint is: https://{domain}/realms/{realm}/broker/{idpid}/token
Call the IDP's token introspection endpoint to validate the IDP access token.
Act accordingly if the IDP responds that the token is not valid. Respond with 401 and ensure that the Keycloak access token can't be used again. Maybe the end_session_endpoint or revocation_endpoint, not sure.
Token validation endpoints:
Google: https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v3/tokeninfo?access_token={access_token}
AuthO: https://{tenant}.eu.auth0.com/userinfo
MS Azure: doesn't exist, good luck with that!
Related
i am quite new to kubernetes and I am looking towards certificate based authentication and token based authentication for calling K8 apis. To my understanding, I feel token based approach (openID + OAuth2) is better since id_token will get refreshed by refresh_token at a certain interval and it also works well with the login point(web browser) which is not the case with Certificate based approach . Any more thoughts to this ? I am working using minikube with kubernetes . Can anyone share their thoughts here ?
Prefer OpenID Connect or X509 Client Certificate-based authentication strategies over the others when authenticating users
X509 client certs: decent authentication strategy, but you'd have to address renewing and redistributing client certs on a regular basis
Static Tokens: avoid them due to their non-ephemeral nature
Bootstrap Tokens: same as static tokens above
Basic Authentication: avoid them due to credentials being transmitted over the network in cleartext
Service Account Tokens: should not be used for end-users trying to interact with Kubernetes clusters, but they are the preferred authentication strategy for applications & workloads running on Kubernetes
OpenID Connect (OIDC) Tokens: best authentication strategy for end users as OIDC integrates with your identity provider (e.g. AD, AWS IAM, GCP IAM ...etc)
I advice you to use OpenID Connect. OpenID Connect is based on OAuth 2.0. It is designed with more of an authentication focus in mind however. The explicit purpose of OIDC is to generate what is known as an id-token. The normal process of generating these tokens is much the same as it is in OAuth 2.0.
OIDC brings a step closer to providing with a user-friendly login experience and also to allow us to start restricting their access using RBAC.
Take also look on Dex which acts as a middleman in the authentication chain. It becomes the Identify Provider and issuer of ID tokens for Kubernetes but does not itself have any sense of identity. Instead, it allows you to configure an upstream Identity Provider to provide the users’ identity.
As well as any OIDC provider, Dex supports sourcing user information from GitHub, GitLab, SAML, LDAP and Microsoft. Its provider plugins greatly increase the potential for integrating with your existing user management system.
Another advantage that Dex brings is the ability to control the issuance of ID tokens, specifying the lifetime for example. It also makes it possible force your organization to re-authenticate. With Dex, you can easily revoke all tokens but there is no way to revoke a single token.
Dex also handles refresh tokens for users. When a user logs in to Dex they may be granted an id-token and a refresh token. Programs such as kubectl can use these refresh tokens to re-authenticate the user when the id-token expires. Since these tokens are issued by Dex, this allows you to stop a particular user refreshing by revoking their refresh token. This is really useful in the case of a lost laptop or phone.
Furthermore, by having a central authentication system such as Dex, you need only configure the upstream provider once.
An advantage of this setup is that if any user wants to add a new service to the SSO system, they only need to open a PR to Dex configuration. This setup also provides users with a one-button “revoke access” in the upstream identity provider to revoke their access from all of our internal services. Again this comes in very useful in the event of a security breach or lost laptop.
More information you can find here: kubernetes-single-sign-one-less-identity/, kubernetes-security-best-practices.
When a request with the bearer token hits a microservice, does microservice talk to keycloak to validate the token for each request?
Is traffic "Step 5" configurable via keycloak adapter?
No, that would make too many requests. In initialization phase microservice loads public key and signing algorithm from Keycloak’s well known config page. On each request microservice checks the signature of the bearer token.
Access token lifespan should not be too long and that is how you force your frontend to periodically go to Keycloak and refresh the bearer.
If you run your microservice, every time you send a request to an api after adding the token in the logs you will see "Loaded URLs from http://localhost:8080/auth/realms/{realm-name}/.well-known/openid-configuration". Upon clicking this link you will see that there are a set of URLs present here, endpoints for token generation, userinfo etc.,there are endpoints for getting the certs and signing keys as well via which the signing key of the token is verified.
(This will only happen if keycloak properties are defined in application.properties/application.yml)
Step 5 will happen on using Keycloak adapter (Choice of adapter given in keycloak documentation)
I'm using keycloak as authorization server. The users send own username/password to MyWebApp and MyWebApp with grant_type: password get the token and then response token to the user. Now I want to my users be able to get their information, change their password and everything related to themselves RESTFUL. When I send a rest request to /{realm}/users/{id} to get user information, The keycloak get 403 error response. How can I get user information without admin access from keyclaok?
Note: I've seen this question, But I want to give the user edit profile too.
I think you are using Oauth with Grant type=password. If the token you mentioned is generate by Keycloak. You can request user information to Keycloak using /userinfo endpoint.
This is example of endpoint:
"http://localhost:8080/auth/realms/demo/protocol/openid-connect/userinfo"
This is how to send the parameters:
https://connect2id.com/products/server/docs/api/userinfo
GET /userinfo HTTP/1.1
Host: c2id.com
Authorization: Bearer Gp7b5hiURKpWzEXgMJP38EnYimgxlBC1PpS2zGXUqe
As far as i know in new versions of Keycloak, Account application (~/auth/realms/{realm}/account) will be implemented as REST backend so your users will be able to work with their profile data in RESTful way (check out keycloak blog).
If you can't wait too long for such feature, you could implement your own REST backend for user profile operations. It mean that you have to implement REST endpoint Service Provider, and integrate to that API your custom set of Keycloak Roles (Your also may to implement endpoint without checks for any roles, so only bearer authentication required). Check Keycloak development docs, also you could use Keycloak sources, especially org.keycloak.services.resources.admin package as implementation example.
PS. For viewing user info, consider using User Info OIDC endpoint (See Hlex answer). It also could be customized via OIDC mappers (Clients -> {client Id} -> Mappers tab)
We are using Apigee as our Authorization Server (AS) and we have a few Spring Restful services deployed in IBM Bluemix public cloud which acts as our Resource server (RS).
Each of the services has an equivalent proxy service configured in Apigee. For the proxy services, we have configured the VerifyOAuthTokens policy to verify the token passed by the user and return an error if invalid token is passed
The problem is, since our RS is in the public cloud (no plans or need of moving to a dedicated or private cloud) the api endpoints are open and can be invoked by anyone who knows the url.Though the expectation is everyone should call the apis via APIGEE proxies but we cannot force that since we are in public cloud and there are no options of opening ports coming from apigee or something. We would like to take the following approach to secure the api endpoints.
Accept the Authorization header for each call
Take the token and call a validate token service in Apigee
For 2, We are not able to find an APIGEE api which can validate an access token similar to say googles
https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v1/tokeninfo?access_token=1/fFBGRNJru1FQd44AzqT3Zg
or Github's
GET /applications/:client_id/tokens/:access_token
Is there actually an external APIGEE service to validate a token?
If not, what would be the best way to make sure that only valid users with valid tokens can access the apis?
Thanks,
Tatha
Did you look at this post in the Apigee Community: Using third-party OAuth tokens
We did something similar to this but not using oauth tokens. We used Apigee to do a callout to a third party IDP (identity provider). The 3rd party IDP wasn't able to generate tokens but exposed a web service to authenticate the user. If the user was authenticated successfully (based on interpreting the result received back from the target endpoint webservice), then you tell Apigee that it was successful by setting the external authorization status to true (step #2 in the link).
NOTE: this has to be done inside an Assign Message Policy step PRIOR to the GenerateAccess token operation. Apigee interprets this as a successful authorization and then can generate a valid oauth token that the caller can then send along to access the protected API.
I'm implementing an Ouath2 authentication with Spring for our mobile API. So far it works but I don't know how I should keep the resource server separate. So I have an auth server which gives out tokens and refresh tokens using the password grant-type. Meaning the user would log into the mobile app, which sends the auth server the client id/client secret along with the user's
credentials, which results in an access token and a refresh token for the user with the appropriate (ROLE_USER) privileges. Another web based client is for the admins who do the same and get the ROLE_ADMIN privilege etc.
This works well so far.
Now if any client sends a request to the resource server what should happen? Should the resource server check the token's validity? If so in what way? Or should the auth server copy the token into the resource-server's database?
If you #EnableResourceServer you get a filter that checks access tokens. It needs to share a TokenStore with the auth server. That's about it to get something working.